



Title of Dissertation: NUCLEAR REACTIONS:  TESTING A 
MESSAGE-CENTERED EXTENSION OF 
ENDURING PREDICTIONS ABOUT EXPERT 
AND LAY PERSON PERCEPTIONS OF AND 
REACTIONS TO RISK 
  
Sarah Anne Evans, Doctor of Philosophy, 2011  
 
Dissertation Directed By:    Professor Monique M. Turner 
     Department of Communication 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to critically examine differences in risk 
perceptions among experts and lay people.  In particular, this project aimed to address 
inconsistent definitions of ―expert‖ found in the existing literature and to test the 
predictions of the psychometric paradigm in the context of communication.  To examine 
the effect of message features and expertise on risk perceptions and evaluations of risk 
characteristics, this dissertation employed a 2 (emotional appeal:  fear, anger) x 2 
(message topic:  nuclear energy, traffic accidents) x 4 (expertise:  general risk assessors, 
traffic safety experts, nuclear energy experts, lay people) between-participants design.   
The results replicated some findings of the existing research.  First, in the main, 
experts reported lower risk perceptions than lay people.  Second, expressed fear led to 
increased risk perceptions compared to expressed anger.  This study also advanced theory 
regarding risk perception and risk communication in two critical ways.  First, differences 
were found not only between experts and lay people but also among the various expert 
groups, and, even in the expert groups, these differences were influenced in meaningful 
ways by the messages viewed.  Second, this study demonstrated the potential for 
messages to affect not only risk perceptions but also the evaluation of risk characteristics, 
 
 
a possibility not previously tested.  Specifically, the findings indicated that emotional 
appeals and message topic can affect evaluations of risk characteristics for risks both 
related to the message and unrelated to the message.  The messages’ effects on 
evaluations of risk characteristics were, in fact, more pronounced than the effects of the 
messages on general risk perceptions.  The results suggest the factors argued to be 
predictive of risk perception (dread risk and knowledge risk), presented previously as 
characteristics inherent to risks rather than as targets for influence, can be altered through 
strategic communication.  Both theoretical and applied implications of these results are 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
In risk communication research, much attention has been given to the discrepancy 
between expert and lay individual judgments of risk (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1993; 
Hansen et al., 2003; Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 1992; Lazo et al., 2000; Salvadori et al., 
2004; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Slovic, 1987).  This incongruity in 
judgments between experts and lay people may stem from the nature of risk 
communication requiring a transition from the technical to the public ―sphere of 
argument‖ (Goodnight, 1982).  That is due to the scientific nature of risk, which requires 
risk assessment to be taken from the technical sphere in which professionals (i.e., risk 
assessors, risk managers) communicate through scientific jargon and strict(er) rules to the 
public sphere in which messages about risk must be simple, clear, understandable, and 
accessible to lay people.  The ability of the risk communicator to transition from the 
technical sphere to the public sphere is essential to widespread understanding and 
informed risk decision-making (Marzec, 2009).  Such a transition, however, is certainly 
not simple in practice.   
The challenge of transitioning from the technical to the public sphere is 
demonstrated by lay risk perceptions that are not aligned with, and sometimes in 
opposition to, expert risk assessments.  In some cases, risks that experts deem to be 
relatively small can cause anger and fear in the public.  For example, the detection of 
trace amounts of tritium in groundwater near nuclear power plants (e.g. Braidwood 
Generating Station) caused anger and fear in the local communities (EPA, 2006).  In the 




public was not at risk, community members nonetheless expressed fear and even refused 
to drink the groundwater (―Braidwood Tritium Project,‖ 2010).   
On the other end of the risk perception spectrum, attempts to bring attention to the 
relatively large risk of traffic accidents seem futile.  According to National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), 
for each of the past 15 years, more than 40 thousand Americans have died in fatal traffic 
accidents (NHTSA, 2009).  A sense of risk or threat, however, escapes the public when it 
comes to traffic safety and driving behaviors (AAAFTS, 2009; Slovic, 1987).  For 
example, within the 30 days prior to completing the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety’s 
Traffic Safety Culture Index, over half of drivers interviewed had used their cell phones 
while driving, and two in five had driven 15 miles per hour over the speed limit at least 
once (AAAFTS, 2009).   
Though the existence of a gap between expert and lay individual risk evaluations 
has been well-established (Flynn, 1993; Kraus, Malmfors, & Lazo, Kinnell, & Fisher, 
2000; Salvadori, Savio, Nacotra, Rumiati, Finucane, & Slovic, 2004; Slovic, 1987; 
Slovic, 1992); in this dissertation I argue that a satisfactory explanation as to why the 
discrepancy exists, and under what conditions it may be more or less pronounced, is 
incomplete.  In order for risk communicators to overcome the challenge of successfully 
transitioning from the technical to public sphere and thereby ensuring lay people have the 
knowledge and tools necessary to make sound decisions regarding risks, the underlying 
cause of the discrepancy between expert and lay person risk perceptions must be better 
understood.  This dissertation will specifically examine contexts in which the expert-lay 




Significant contributions to this area of research have been made by Paul Slovic 
and Baruch Fischhoff (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 
1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979) via what is now called the psychometric 
paradigm.  Research in the area of the psychometric paradigm indicates lay people 
evaluate risk on multiple factors.  Rather than using a single indicator or scale, such as 
estimated frequency of deaths caused by a risk, lay people tend to evaluate risk on several 
of the factors identified by the psychometric paradigm—novelty, severity of 
consequences, extent to which the risk is known to those exposed, scientific knowledge, 
voluntariness, number of people likely to be killed in an accident (catastrophic potential), 
control over the risk, immediacy of effects, and dread potential (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 
2005; Slovic, 1987).  Such a multi-dimensional approach to risk has been used to explain 
the discrepancy between expert and lay person risk assessments.  Generally, lay person 
risk estimates tend not to match probabilistic risk—with some risks being overestimated 
and some underestimated.  More specifically, the psychometric paradigm predicts lay 
person evaluations of risks will be influenced by affective and subjective components 
(dimensions) of risk, and experts will evaluate risks probabilistically, based on an 
estimated frequency of deaths caused by each risk. 
 There are several methodological artifacts represented in this literature, however, 
that warrant further exploration of the discrepancy between expert and lay assessments.  
First, the term ―expert‖ has not been consistently defined.  In the original research on this 
topic (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979), experts were chosen for their 
professional involvement with risk assessment and came from varying areas of domain 




conclusions across studies and generalizations difficult.  Second, extant literature on the 
psychometric paradigm assessed risk perceptions in the absence of communication.  The 
dimensions of the psychometric paradigm are presented as a guide to risk ―personality 
profiles‖ rather than as features that might be externally influenced or determined 
(Barnett & Breakwell, 2001).  Specifically, the role of discrete emotion in risk 
perception, which is well established in other areas of the risk perception literature, is 
ignored by the psychometric paradigm.  Though the psychometric paradigm accounts for 
affect-related characteristics inherent to individual risks, it does not take into account the 
discrete experienced emotion within the individual person making judgments about the 
risk.  Of particular interest to communication scholars is how communication shapes and 
reinforces such risk perceptions.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the psychometric paradigm to include 
not only dread and knowledge characteristics of risks but also message-induced emotions 
experienced by the individuals evaluating the risks.  The following sections provide an 
overview of the importance of risk perception to risk communication as well as the 
foundational research that led to the psychometric paradigm.  Gaps in this research will 
be identified, followed by an argument that the literature on emotion and risk perception 
provide insight as to the direction research on the psychometric paradigm and risk 
communication should take.  The dissertation will continue with a study to test the 
proposed effects of messages on the risk characteristics identified by the psychometric 
paradigm and conclude with results and a discussion of implications and directions for 




Chapter 2:  Theoretical Foundations  
Risk communication:  What is it and why does it matter? 
 
Risk communication can be described as involving the exchange of information 
regarding the significance, magnitude, and control of a risk (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).  
More specifically it is the exchange of information ―among risk assessors, risk managers, 
other stakeholders, and the public about levels of risk, the significance and meaning of 
those risks, and the decisions, actions, or policies aimed at managing or controlling the 
risks‖ (USDA, 2001, p. 6).  The goal of such communication can be to inform, to engage 
people in the decision-making process regarding risk (Trettin & Musham, 2000) through 
a two-way process in which the general public not only receives information but also 
provides feedback (Slovic, 1986; Tanaka, 1998), or to influence and/or change behavior 
(Rohrmann, 1998).   
It is important to note that several purposes are identified in these definitions.  
Risk communication may be persuasive in nature (influencing or changing attitudes and 
behavior), but it may also aim to inform or engage.  In the latter instances, risk 
communication assists people in better understanding a risk so they can come to their 
own decisions about the appropriate response or behavior (Renn, 1998).   In this way, risk 
communication can equip members of the public with the knowledge and tools necessary 
to make informed decisions for themselves as well as others (e.g. parents making 
decisions for family members).  To do so successfully, it is imperative that risk 
communicators understand how people come to understand risks and the contextual 




To come to such an understanding, the concept of risk itself needs further 
explanation.  Each component of the definition provided for risk communication 
references risk as if it is a self-explanatory variable.  Risk, however, is a complex concept 
that is defined and treated differently across disciplines and contexts.  Researchers in 
decision theory equate risk in terms of certainty of outcomes with higher uncertainty 
indicating higher risk (Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979).  The hard sciences (i.e. chemistry, 
biology, and physics) tend to define risk in a manner that utilizes the probability of 
negative outcomes (Freudenburg, 1988; Henley & Kumamoto, 1996; Solomon, Giesy, & 
Jones, 2000).  Risk, in this way, is ―probabilistic‖ (Solomon, Giesy, & Jones, 2000) or 
―objective‖ risk (Lipkus, Rimer, & Strigo, 1996).  The term ―objective‖ can be 
misleading, however, as even statistically based risk estimates are influenced by 
researcher subjectivity—perhaps in choice of sampling method, or risk assessment model 
applied for example (Rohrmann, 1998).  Nonetheless, probabilistic risk of this type is 
sometimes equated with true or, real risk (Freudenburg, 1988). 
Embracing the role of subjectivity in assessments of risk, on the other hand, are 
those scholars who place emphasis on risk as a social perception rather than a true, or 
objective reality (Mirel, 1994).  Social science researchers, for example, take into account 
qualitative factors (in addition to quantitative factors) when defining risk.  Research in 
the area of the psychometric paradigm indicates lay people evaluate risk on multiple 
levels.  Rather than using a single indicator, such as estimated frequency of deaths caused 
by a risk (or probability of negative outcomes), lay people tend to evaluate a risk on 




The concept ―risk" means different things to different people. When experts judge 
risk, their responses correlate highly with technical estimates of annual fatalities. 
Lay people can assess annual fatalities if they are asked to (and produce estimates 
somewhat like the technical estimates). However, their judgments of "risk" are 
related more to other hazard characteristics (for example, catastrophic potential, 
threat to future generations) and, as a result, tend to differ from their own (and 
experts') estimates of annual fatalities.  (p. 283) 
These other characteristics to which Slovic referred address people’s perceptions, 
and risk defined in such a manner is often referred to as ―perceived risk‖ (Freudenburg, 
1988; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, 1979).  Such a multi-dimensional 
approach to perceived risk has been used to explain the discrepancy between expert and 
lay person evaluations of risk (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, 1979) and 
provides a potential opportunity to influence risk perceptions.  It is this type of perceived 
risk that is of interest in this dissertation. 
The important challenge facing risk communicators is to understand when and 
why a gap between expert and lay person evaluations of risk exists so that message 
receivers’ behavior is not negatively impacted by an incomplete or misguided 
understanding of the risks.  Importantly, it has been argued that the most common 
theoretical influencer of risk communication scholarship is the psychometric paradigm 
(Abraham, 2009).  This claim has been supported by empirical evidence as well.  A 
systematic analysis of the literature revealed that Slovic and Fischhoff are the 
predominant authors in the field of risk communication, cited 254 and 118 times 




& Kuttschreuter, 2004).  The dominance of the psychometric paradigm in the area of risk 
communication and its limitations that have yet to be explained, or even thoroughly 
empirically investigated, make this theory an essential topic for further research.   
Current literature on the influence of the dimensions of the psychometric 
paradigm and emotion on risk perceptions both provide the groundwork for this study 
and reveal important gaps in the extant literature warranting further empirical inquiry.  
The following sections provide an overview of this prior research focusing first on the 
early research identifying differences between expert and lay person risk perceptions and 
leading into an explanation of the psychometric paradigm which is currently heavily 
relied upon in risk communication.  Areas in need of further inquiry will be identified and 
will lead into discussion of the role of message-induced emotion in risk evaluations 
(which is not considered in current psychometric paradigm literature).   
Early Research:  Identifying Differences in Expert and Lay Judgments of Risk 
 
In their pioneering research examining differences between expert and lay person 
risk perceptions, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1979) asserted that there is a 
subjective component to risk assessment, and the manner in which judgments are often 
biased must be understood before the public can be educated about risks.  For this reason, 
the researchers sought to understand how lay and expert risk evaluations might differ 
systematically.  In the initial study, Slovic’s team compared three groups of lay people 
(League of Women Voters, college students, and business and professional members of 
the Active Club) with a group of experts.  Experts were selected on the basis of 
professional involvement in risk assessment.  All participants considered 30 risks and 




to rank the risks from least risky to most risky.  Similarities were seen across the three 
groups of lay individuals, but, there were statistically significant differences between 
overall lay person risk perceptions and expert risk perceptions.  Slovic’s team posited that 
the differences in risk perceptions resulted from different approaches to risk, arguing that: 
The experts’ judgments of risk were so closely related to the statistical or 
calculated frequencies that it seems reasonable to conclude that they both knew 
what the technical estimates were and viewed the risk of an activity or technology 
as synonymous with them.  The risk judgments of lay people, however, were only 
moderately related to annual death rates, raising the possibility that, for them, risk 
may not be synonymous with fatalities. (p. 191) 
The possibility that lay people were just inaccurate in predicting frequencies of 
deaths per year was considered but not supported by the data.  When asked specifically to 
estimate frequencies of deaths caused by each risk per year, lay people provided 
estimates that did not correspond to their estimates of the ―riskiness‖ of an activity or 
technology, indicating that lay people were not simply inaccurate in judging frequencies 
but rather were using different or additional information when judging risks.  For 
example, lay people rated nuclear power as the highest risk but as causing the lowest 
number of fatalities—which could be explained by lay persons’ consideration of a 
disaster potential.   
Slovic’s team asked participants to estimate the number of deaths they would 
expect if this year was particularly disastrous.  Nuclear power produced a mean disaster 
multiplier of 100 (high potential for disaster).  However, most risks showed little 




deviating little from estimates for a typical year.  Given disaster potential was not seen 
for risks other than nuclear energy, this characteristic could only partially explain why lay 
perceptions differed from those of experts (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979).   
In an attempt to provide a more complete theoretical explanation of the data, 
Slovic’s team also examined nine qualitative characteristics of risk.  These factors were 
measured using seven-point Likert scales instructing participants to rate the extent to 
which risks were voluntarily undertaken, the extent to which death occurred immediately 
or the effects were delayed, the extent to which the risks were known precisely by the 
person who was exposed to those risks, the extent that the risks were known to science, 
the level of control participants perceived they had if they were exposed to the risk, the 
extent to which a risk kills people one at a time (chronic risk) or a large number of people 
at once (catastrophic risk), the extent to which the risk was one that people have learned 
to live with and can think about calmly, or was one for which people have great dread, 
and how likely it was that the consequence will be fatal if the risk was realized 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978).  
Across all 30 risks, ratings of perceived dread and perceived severity of 
consequences were closely related to lay evaluations of risk (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1979).  Expert judgments, however, were not related to any of the nine 
factors.  Slovic et al. concluded that lay individuals approached the evaluation of risk 
more holistically, and experts evaluated risks based on estimated fatalities.  This research 
program ultimately became what is now known as the psychometric paradigm (Slovic, 





The Psychometric Paradigm 
 
As indicated previously, lay people tend to evaluate a risk by considering the 
factors identified by the psychometric paradigm.  The psychometric paradigm predicts 
that factors of dread, newness, and potential for catastrophic effects vary across risks in 
measurable and predictable ways (Slovic, 1987).   According to this paradigm, the factors 
predicting risk perception are newness, severity of consequences, knowledge about the 
risk possessed by those exposed, scientific knowledge, voluntariness, number of people 
killed in an accident, control over risk, immediacy, and dread potential (Siegrist, Keller, 
& Kiers, 2005).   
Factor analysis revealed that the factors discussed above can be grouped into two 
main components for psychometric analysis (Slovic, 1987).  Dread risk is the extent to 
which the consequences evoke fear (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006) and is highly 
correlated with rating scales of perceived lack of control, dread potential, and fatal 
consequences (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005).  Knowledge risk (Boholm, 1998), i.e. 
unknown risk, is the extent to which risk is seen as controllable or uncertain (Taylor-
Gooby & Zinn, 2006) and is highly correlated with the rating scales of perceived 
newness, perceived scientific knowledge, and delay of effects (Siegrist, Keller, & Kiers, 
2005).   
Participants in studies investigating the psychometric paradigm are typically 
asked to answer seven-point Likert-type questions measuring these factors (Fischhoff, 
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 1978).  For example, to measure common-dread, 
participants in a study conducted by Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read and Combs 




think about calmly, or whether it is a risk for which people have great dread (i.e. it causes 
anxiety and worry and perhaps even panic).  Consider, for example, nuclear energy which 
is a risk that Slovic and colleagues (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 
1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979) found a large discrepancy between expert 
and lay individual perceptions of risk.   
In the Fischhoff et al. study, lay participants rated nuclear power as highly 
dreadful (M = 6.42 with 1 being ―common‖ and 7 being ―dreadful‖).  For the remaining 
eight factors mean ratings for nuclear power were:  voluntariness (M = 6.51), immediacy 
(M = 5.08), known to those exposed (M = 5.85), known to science (M = 4.83), 
controllability (M = 1.36), newness (M = 1.35), chronic-catastrophic (M = 6.43), and 
severity of consequences (M = 5.98).  These data suggest that lay participants felt nuclear 
power wasn’t voluntary, wasn’t immediate, wasn’t known to the exposed or to science, 
can’t be controlled, is still new, is catastrophic, and has risks fairly certain to be fatal 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, 1978).   
Experts, however, ranked nuclear energy 20
th
 of 30 risks, from most risky to least 
risky, while the League of Women Voter and college student groups ranked nuclear 
energy as the most risky of 30 risks.  Interestingly, nuclear power tends to be judged high 
on both the dread and unknown factors by lay people in other studies also (Peters, 
Burraston, & Mertz, 2004).  Regarding lay perceptions, Boholm (1998) wrote that 
nuclear power is ―perceived to be unknown, dreadful, uncontrollable, catastrophic and 
having delayed adverse effects on future generations‖ (Boholm, 1998, p. 139).  
Particularly interesting, however, is how much these public risk perceptions differ from 




have been replicated with both expert and lay person samples (Slovic, 1987).  The 
question then remains:  Why are experts not as influenced by the dreadful, 
uncontrollable, and potentially catastrophic nature of risks (relative to lay people)?  And, 
are there contexts in which this expert effect would diminish? 
Although some risks (e.g., nuclear) are over-estimated, other risks lead to lay 
person evaluations of low risk when the risk is actually higher (an optimistic bias).  Some 
of the fundamental research on layperson risk assessment and decision-making 
determined that people evaluate traffic accidents as only somewhat dreadful and less 
voluntary and easily reduced than the risks associated with transportation via bicycle or 
motorcycle (Slovic, 1987).  It seems that people see traffic accidents as a risk that is not 
only more likely to affect other people but also only likely to affect them personally at the 
fault of other drivers (AAA Foundation, 2009).  In this dissertation, I will compare 
nuclear energy and traffic risks because they lay on opposite ends of the risk perception 
continuum with one risk being overestimated and the other underestimated. 
The aforementioned evaluation demonstrates the perceived involuntary nature of 
the traffic risks and an optimistic bias that can make risk communication particularly 
difficult for experts who understand automobile accidents pose a statistically serious risk.  
These two different risks (traffic accidents and nuclear energy) are clear examples of the 
gap existing between objective and perceived risk perceptions—one of overestimation 
and one of underestimation.  Figure 1 visually demonstrates the differences between 
traffic and nuclear energy risks according to the psychometric paradigm’s factors of 
dread risk and unknown risk (Slovic, 1987).  The qualitative aspects of risk that make up 




risk perceptions observed (Barnett, & Breakwell, 2001; Fife-Schaw & Rowe, 2000; 
Marris, Langford, & Riordan, 1998; Slovic, 1987), and this dissertation assumes the 
existence of such factors.   
In the years following the initial Slovic study, multiple researchers have collected 
data supporting the pattern of experts and lay people differing in their formations of risk 
perceptions across a wide range of topics including food-related risks (Hanson, Holm,  
 
Figure 1.  Visual representation of how traffic accident risks and nuclear energy risks 







































Frewer, Robinson, & Sandoe, 2003), ecosystem risks (Lazo, Kinnell, & Fisher, 2000), 
global climate change (Lazo, Kinnell, & Fisher, 2000), chemical (Kraus, Malmfors, & 
Slovic, 1992), biotechnology (Salvadori, Savio, Nacotra, Rumiati, Finucane, & Slovic, 
2004), and radioactive waste disposal (Flynn, 1993).  Similar results are expected in the 
present study. 
 
 H1:  There will be a main effect of expertise, such that experts will report lower 
risk perceptions than lay people. 
 
Though this general prediction that came out of the psychometric paradigm work 
is expected to be replicated, there are several limitations of the psychometric paradigm 
research that should be addressed as they could provide insight regarding under what 
circumstances this difference between experts and lay people will persist.   
Limitations of the Psychometric Paradigm 
 
Perhaps because it makes intuitive sense, articles challenging the notion that 
experts and lay people evaluate risks differently are scarce (but see Rowe & Wright, 
2001).  There are, however, both theoretical and methodological concerns that should be 
improved upon in future risk communication research involving the psychometric 
paradigm.  First, theoretically, the psychometric paradigm is simply a descriptive tool and 
may be too broad in scope.  Although the explanation of risk perceptions being affected 
by the amount of dread and knowledge helps explain why some risks are perceived as 




of the factor space (see Figure 1) might function differently.  The factor space is 
presented as though it is based on internal characteristics of risk that are unchanging 
without consideration of potential influencers that may change evaluations of these 
characteristics (Barnett & Breakwell, 2001). 
Inconsistent definitions of expert 
Further, methodological issues need to be addressed.  A meta-analysis took issue 
with how the expert sample in the original sample was defined and as a result argued that 
no conclusions could presently (p. 356) be drawn regarding differences in risk 
perceptions between experts and lay people (Rowe & Wright, 2001).  In the original 
psychometric paradigm research (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979), experts were 
chosen for their professional involvement with risk assessment and came from varying 
areas of domain expertise (i.e. geography, economics, biology, and law).  In more recent 
studies domain expertise has been employed as the operationalization of expert, making 
generalizable conclusions across studies difficult.  Rowe and Wright (2001) called for 
researchers to be more precise in defining their sample because ―expert‖ had been 
operationalized differently across the studies reviewed making it difficult if not 
impossible to draw firm conclusions.   
Scholars continue to design studies stemming from Slovic’s original argument, 
however, and no one has conducted a study examining the potential impacts of variations 
in the term ―expert.‖  In other words, one type of expert may be those with a background 
in risk assessment (e.g. Slovic, Ficshhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979), while another type of 
expert, may be those with a specific level of training in the specific threat (e.g. a nuclear 




perception literature.  An unanswered question, then, is whether two distinct groups of 
domain experts (in this case traffic and nuclear) would rate domain specific risks 
similarly. 
Expert-lay person conceptualizations of risk 
Some scholars have asserted that the notion that experts do not consider 
qualitative factors of risk when making evaluations, could be misleading.  It is taken for 
granted in the psychometric paradigm research that experts base risk assessments on 
more objective information—such a procedure for expert evaluations is presented as self-
evident.  It seems clear, however, that any person making a risk assessment has a choice 
in terms of the type of information to employ in their assessment.  Slovic (1987) touches 
on this argument in explaining that lay people can be influenced to ―objectively‖ rate 
frequencies of death, but the possibility that experts might choose to (or be influenced to) 
evaluate risks on the more qualitative and emotional aspects of the risk is ignored in the 
literature.   
Research on emotion management, however, is particularly interesting when 
considered in this context.  In general, organizations are positioned as rational entities, 
and emotion management is argued to be critical to organizational success (Kersten, 
2005).  Furthermore, public relations managers are presented as dealing with and 
managing public emotion—in such a way to minimize the effect of emotion on decision-
making.  There is also neurological evidence that emotion affects decision-making (Berns 
et al., 2006; Davidson, 2003; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003).  Such 





Table 1.  Definition of “Expert” Across Existing Studies 
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emotion at the human level, not by type of training or profession (Naqvi, Shiv, & 
Bechara, 2006).  Furthermore, there is literature providing advice on managing emotions 
in order to better perform in certain areas, such as investing.  In the context of this 
research, experts are not presented as immune to emotion but rather as actively 
controlling the influence of emotion on their decisions (Lucey & Dowling, 2005; Seo & 
Barrett, 2007; Waldman, 1996; Zinn, 2008).   
 Given this evidence, perhaps it is not that experts broadly use different 
information than lay people when judging a risk but that certain experts are trained to 
make evaluations in a particular manner in specific contexts.  That is, a nuclear energy 
expert would be trained to suppress emotion when dealing with the risk of nuclear 
energy, but would not necessarily or automatically apply such training in the context of 
evaluating risks in other domains.   
A test of this idea will require a more carefully formulated definition of expert.  
Specifically a distinction between risk assessment expertise and domain expertise should 
be made.  It is expected that depending on the specific area of expertise, risk perceptions 
will be affected differently.   
H1b:   There were be a main effect of expertise such that experts who evaluate a 
risk within their domain of expertise will have more accurate risk 
perceptions than lay people and experts for whom the risk is outside of 
their domain.   
In the case of traffic safety, for which an optimistic bias is expected in the general public 




other expertise groups.  On the other hand, in the case of nuclear energy, nuclear energy 
experts are expected to have lower risk perceptions than other expertise groups. 
Lack of control for biological sex 
Furthermore, important demographic characteristics were not controlled for in the 
original psychometric paradigm research (Slovic, 1987).  Namely, the gender 
composition of the different groups was not considered.  The expert group, which was 
small (n = 15), was almost entirely male (only three women) while the League of Women 
Voters lay group was not surprisingly primarily female (68 percent female—Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979).  This is an essential limitation as more recent research 
has shown that risk perceptions vary along biological sex lines.   
Specifically, men tend to evaluate potential threats as less risky than women (the 
same pattern seen between the expert and lay groups in the Slovic study).  In fact, even 
when comparing male and female scientists, significant differences in risk perceptions are 
found.  For example, Barke et al. (1997) found that female scientists (from the ―hard‖ 
sciences) evaluated the risk of nuclear technologies higher their male counterparts (p < 
0.05).  Similarly, Slovic et al. (1995) found that female toxicologists were more likely 
than male toxicologists to judge risks as moderate or high threats.  Such a pattern is often 
referred to as the ―white male effect‖ (Finucane et al., 2000).   
Furthermore, societal factors have historically led to fewer women than men 
going into technical and scientific fields (Alper, 1993) making it imperative to control for 
biological sex to truly statistically establish that the differences that lie between expert 




compositions of those groups.  It is therefore expected that biological sex will be a 
significant predictor of risk assessments such that: 
H2a:   Women’s risk perceptions will be higher than men’s risk perceptions 
regardless of expertise. 
H2b:   The relationship between expertise and risk perceptions will be attenuated 
when controlling for biological sex. 
Absence of a communication context 
A final limitation is that extant research on the psychometric paradigm measures 
individuals risk perceptions as if they were stable and not influenced by external 
communication.  Yet, research is clear that the vast majority of individuals co-create their 
risk perceptions with the influence of external messages.  In fact, some scholars have 
gone so far as to argue communication is the only way to initiate responses to risk, and, 
further, that risks would lack meaning completely in the absence of communication.  
Luhmann (1986) argues that: 
Fish may die or human beings; drinking water or swimming in rivers or lakes may 
cause diseases; we may run out of oil; the global temperature may rise or fall; all 
these effects will not cause any societal effects unless society communicates 
about it… Society observes nature and environment through communication. 
Communicating meaning is the only means for initiating responses: therefore it 
can regulate communication only by other forms of communication. In essence, it 
is society which poses a threat to its survival, not the environment. (p. 63; 





Through social interaction and communication, perceptions of risks can be 
amplified and attenuated (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson, & 
Ratick., 1988; Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Renn, 1991; Renn, Burns, Kasperson, & 
Kasperson, 1992).  As it was defined in the first section of this dissertation, risk 
communication can inform or even persuade—that is, change risk perceptions.  It would 
be particularly useful to know if risk perceptions existing in one quadrant are more 
difficult to change, with a risk message, than risk perceptions in another quadrant.  
Likewise, it would be useful to know if one quadrant is more important in terms of public 
policy or risk interventions (e.g. risks that currently (pre-communication) are 
underestimated by the public leading to insufficient preventative action (e.g., risk of 
obesity)).  The psychometric paradigm does not provide guidance as to how the 
qualitative factors of risks might be influenced, particularly through communication, and 
if such communication could in fact move a risk into a quadrant that may be more easily 
targeted in a public health campaign.   
The extant literature on the psychometric paradigm and the expert-lay person risk 
perception discrepancy has tested risk perceptions in a vacuum—in the context of no risk 
communication.  Not only does this affect the feasibility of extending predictions from 
the psychometric paradigm to practical contexts for risk communicators, but it also fails 
to address whether or not a risk can move in the factor space—and more specifically, 
whether a perceived risk’s placement in the factor structure is dependent upon the type of 
risk message received.  In fact, as the subsequent section will demonstrate, research has 
shown that discrete emotions, as induced by risk messages, affect individuals’ risk 




Emotion and Risk Perception 
 
Only since the 1980’s have judgment and decision researchers begun to 
incorporate affect into their decision models (see Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).  Moreover, most of those studies that did 
integrate affect into their risk predictions only examined affect and ignored the effects of 
discrete emotions (Johnson & Tversky, 1983).   
The seminal study demonstrating the effect of affect on risk perception was 
conducted by Johnson and Tversky (1983) who experimentally manipulated affect using 
newspaper articles. Johnson and Tversky conducted four experiments.  In the first two 
experiments, participants either read a mundane news story (i.e. a ―people in the news‖ 
column, p. 23) or a story about a tragic event (―the death of a single person,‖ p. 23) 
written to induce negative affect.  The data from both of these experiments indicated that 
when participants experienced negative affect there were global increases in risk 
perceptions.  In the third experiment, Johnson and Tversky asked participants to read 
news stories that either communicated a tragic event or elicited positive affect.  
Experiment four showed that participants who experienced negative affect rated their 
perceptions of risks higher than those who experienced positive affect (as a result of a 
story about a young man who is accepted to medical school and succeeds on a difficult 
exam).  
Two important findings were illuminated by this research.  First, Johnson and 
Tversky’s data indicated that the negative affect caused by the leukemia story affected 
participants’ perceptions of their risk for leukemia.  Second, participants who 




terrorism) higher than those who experienced positive affect prior to completing the risk 
perception survey.  In other words, the negative affect aroused by the leukemia story 
affected judgments which were both related (integral) and unrelated (incidental) to 
leukemia.  Incidental emotions are feelings that are unrelated to the judgment at hand; 
integral emotions, on the other hand, are related to the judgment in consideration (Lerner, 
Han, & Keltner, 2007).  Such findings demonstrated the pervasive influence of affect in 
evaluating everyday risks and also raised an important methodological point as positive 
and negative affect were induced experimentally through the presentation of messages.  
Based on this research, and other studies following in their footsteps, consensus in the 
literature was that positively valenced emotions resulted in lower perceived risk and 
negatively valenced emotions resulted in increased perceived risk (Forgas, 1995; 
Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Wright & Bower, 1992).   
The importance of affective responses to risk perceptions and judgments 
continued to be supported in subsequent research.  Sjoberg (1998) argued that to 
understand risk perception we cannot focus our attention solely on cognition but must 
consider the crucial role of affect.  Epstein (1994) explained that the judgment process 
involves evaluation of evidence in two ways—the first ―intuitive, automatic, natural, 
nonverbal, narrative, and experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and 
rational‖ (p. 710).  Experiential processing tends to be a quicker, easier, and more 
efficient way to come to judgments about risks which are often complex and laden with 
uncertainty (Epstein, 1994). Specific to the role of emotion in experiential processing, 




The experiential system is assumed to be intimately associated with the 
experience of affect … which refer[s] to subtle feelings of which people 
are often unaware … the experiential system automatically searches its 
memory banks for related events, including their emotional 
accompaniments … If the activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate 
actions and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If the feelings 
are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to avoid the 
feelings. (p. 716) 
In this way affect plays a role in coming to judgments about risks and serves as an 
indicator of, or cue for, forming risk perceptions.  These cues are utilized in an effort to 
cognitively simplify risk judgments.  Such use of affect as a cognitive shortcut to 
evaluate complex risks led Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000) to propose 
the ―affect heuristic.‖ 
Affect Heuristic   
The affect heuristic is a cue for judgment based on an affective state produced by 
a particular object or event.  Affect is a state that people experience resulting from 
positive and negative associations with a particular object or event.  As people come to 
associate objects or events with positive or negative affect, their affective reactions can 
serve as a cue for judgment.   For example, an unpleasant affective response can increase 
judged probabilities of risks and lead to actions to avoid these feelings (Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).  Particularly for lay people, the actual probability of 
a risk occurring is less important than the perception of potential consequences and the 




To test this idea, studies have been conducted measuring both cognitive and 
affective aspects of risks (Bargh, 1984; LeDoux, 1996; Sundblad, Biel, & Garling, 2007; 
Zajonc, 1980, 1984a, 1984b).  Cognitive aspects of risk judgments include knowledge of 
cause and negative consequences related to the risk while affective aspects relate to the 
anticipated affect evoked by the risk.  Anticipatory affect may not be experienced while 
presently thinking about a risk but is expected to be experienced in the future in 
conjunction with or as a result of the risk (Sundblad, Biel, & Garling, 2007).  When both 
cognitive and affective components of risks have been measured, affect influenced 
judgments significantly more than cognitive components (Sundblad, Biel, & Garling, 
2007). This may be due in part to the fact that affective responses have been shown to 
occur more quickly than cognitive evaluations (Zajonc, 1980, 1984a, 1984b; Bargh, 
1984; LeDoux, 1996).   
Similarly, Loewenstein et al. (2001) proposed a ―risk-as-feelings‖ hypothesis.  
Like Finucane et al. (2000), Loewenstein et al. (2001) predicted that there are both 
cognitive and affective aspects of risk judgments.  According to their hypothesis, 
attention is given to the anticipated negative affect evoked by threats (also similar to the 
application of the affect heuristic). 
Both cognitive risk perception and anticipated affective response function as 
antecedents to decisions and behavioral intentions; moreover, the two concepts influence 
each other.  In fact, in cases where affective reactions to risks and cognitive assessment 
of risk do not mesh well, affective reactions (opposed to cognitive evaluations) often 
drive behavior (Loewenstein, et al., 2001).  For example, when emotional responses and 




does not seem to match the cognitive severity of the risk (Nesse & Klaas, 1994).  
Loewenstein and colleagues explained: 
Fear causes us to slam on the brakes instead of steering into the skid, immobilizes 
us when we have greatest need for strength, causes sexual dysfunction, insomnia, 
ulcers, and gives us dry mouth and jitters at the very moment when there is the 
greatest premium on clarity and eloquence. (p. 5) 
As I stated earlier, early consensus in the literature was that positively valenced 
emotions, such as happiness, resulted in decreased perceived risk and negatively valenced 
emotions, like fear or anger, resulted in increased risk perceptions (Forgas, 1995; 
Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Wright & Bower, 1992), and some scholars continue to make 
this argument.  The affect heuristic plays a vital role in explaining the differences in 
judgments between lay people and experts.  The argument here is that lay people apply 
the affect heuristic to their risk judgments and experts do not (Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).  Problematically, though, studies of this kind present all 
negative affective states as equivalent (as well as all positive states).  Yet, Nabi (1999) as 
well as Lerner and Keltner (2001)  have argued that valence is not the primary driver of 
risk perception, and that discrete emotions need to be studied.   
Nabi (2010) explained the potential implications of ignoring discrete emotions: 
…if the discrete emotion perspective allows for more precise prediction of actions 
in accordance with emotional arousal, we are better prepared to enact 
interventions responsive to those emotional experiences. Not only would we use 




underlying appraisals resulting in those affects suggest how we might accomplish 
this task. (p. 155)   
Based on an appraisal-based emotion paradigm (e.g. Lazarus, 1994) Lerner and 
Keltner (2001) argued that emotion leads individuals to appraise their immediate 
environment and these appraisals guide subsequent evaluations. Specifically, Lerner and 
Keltner proposed that certainty appraisals were the primary driver of the relationship 
between emotions and risk perceptions. Two similarly valenced emotions, such as anger 
and fear, can elicit opposite outcomes on risk perceptions because they vary with regard 
to certainty and control appraisals.  It is important to note that the psychometric paradigm 
has never been tested an outcome of emotional risk messages.  I will subsequently make 
the case that discrete emotional appeals will affect people’s dread and knowledge 
perceptions. 
Emotion Appraisals:  Appraisal Tendency Framework  
Appraisal theories of emotion date back to the 1960s. The basic premise is that 
emotion is caused by some sort of evaluation of an event—be it interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, or mass-mediated. Arnold (1960) argued that appraisal is the process by 
which individuals assess the personal relevance of an event. Further, he explained that ―to 
arouse an emotion, the object must be appraised as affecting me in some way, affecting 
me personally as an individual with my particular experience and my particular aims‖ (p. 
171).  The basic idea is that a message or event triggers a particular predominant emotion 
which in turn affects the response to the stimulus.  These responses differ along 
physiological, behavioral, and cognitive lines (Frijda, 1986; Levenson, 1994; Oatley & 




Appraisal theorists maintain that all emotions are initiated by an individual’s 
appraisal of events in the environment as they relate to personal well-being and the things 
that are most cared about, and that these appraisals also affect the consequences of 
emotions (Parrot, 2004).  Smith and Ellsworth (1985) identified six cognitive dimensions 
that could be combined to distinguish among discrete emotions: pleasantness (i.e., 
valence), attentional activity, anticipated effort, control, certainty and responsibility.  
Table 2 shows the distinctions among emotions based on these appraisals. 
 
Table 2.  Emotions Mapped onto Smith and Ellsworth’s Dimensions 
 
 Valence Effort Certainty Attention Control Responsibility 
Fear 
 




Unpleasant High Certain High Human Other 
Guilt  
 
Unpleasant High Certain Low Human Self 
Hope  
 




Pleasant Low Certain High Human Self 
Note. 
1
Fear and Hope were at the mid-point for attribution of responsibility to self or others 
 
Of particular interest to risk communication researchers are the dimensions of 
certainty and control. To clarify, certainty is the degree to which future events seem 
predictable and comprehensible; control is the degree to which events seem brought 
about by individual agency versus situational agency; and responsibility is the degree to 
which someone or something other than oneself is believed to be responsible for the 




two cognitive meta-factors discussed in the risk-psychometrics literature: unknown risk 
and "dread" risk (Slovic, 1987). 
Two commonly experienced emotions in risk-related situations, anger and fear, 
are clearly differentiated by these two dimensions. Anger arises from appraisals of 
negative events as being predictable (i.e. high certainty) and intentionally brought about 
by others (i.e. other-responsibility and control). Fear, on the other hand, arises from 
perceptions of negative events as unpredictable (i.e. low certainty) and under situational 
control.  Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that these two distinct emotions influenced 
individual risk judgments: whereas fearful people expressed pessimistic risk estimates 
and risk-averse choices, angry people expressed optimistic risk estimates and risk-
seeking choices.  Similarly, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff (2003) induced 
participants to either feel fear or anger regarding terrorism and then asked participants to 
complete a battery of risk perceptions about both terrorism and non-terrorism related 
risks (e.g., disease).  Their data indicated that anger led to optimistic risk perceptions and 
fear led to pessimistic perceptions of risk. 
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a field experiment was 
conducted to test the framework.  Rather than inducing emotion solely through an article 
or past experience, Lerner et al. (2003) studied a national representative sample of people 
on their emotional responses to the attack and perceptions of the risk of additional attacks 
and more common risks such as homicide and the flu.  Though anger and fear were 
prevalent after the attacks, the researchers strengthened the target emotion by having 
participants write brief essays on why they felt either angry or fearful.  Even in this more 




to lower, more optimistic perceptions of future risks (both terrorism specific and general) 
compared to higher levels of fear which led to more pessimistic and elevated perceptions 
of risk (Lerner et al., 2003). 
A similar pattern is expected to be reproduced here: 
H3:  There will be a main effect of emotional appeal, such that participants who 
read the message targeting fear will report higher risk perceptions than 
those who read the message targeting anger. 
Additionally, given the research explained previously on emotion management 
and the operationalization issues with regard to the term expert, it is also expected that 
emotion will affect people differently based on the type of expertise and the type of risk 
being evaluated, such that: 
H4a:   There will be a main effect for expertise on expressed fear such that lay  
people will report more fear than experts. 
H4b:   There will be a main effect for expertise on expressed anger such that lay  
people will report more anger than experts. 
H4, as a whole, makes the case that lay people will express more emotion relative to 
experts regardless of domain topic, expert domain, or emotional appeal type.  Regardless 
of this predicted main effect, the three predictor variables of interest in this dissertation 
are still expected to interact: 
H5:    There will be a 2-way interaction of risk domain (nuclear, traffic) and 
expertise (lay people, traffic experts, nuclear experts, general risk 
assessors) such that experts reading an emotional appeal regarding a risk 




(i.e., fear for the fear appeal) relative to experts evaluating a risk within 
their domain. 
It further seems reasonable that emotional appeals could affect the evaluation of 
risk characteristics as well as risk perceptions.  These effects could present themselves in 
a similar pattern to those seen when evaluating general risk perceptions, but because the 
psychometric paradigm has not yet been tested in the context of communication 
specifically, research questions are posed.  Furthermore, Slovic (1987) states that the 
factor space has been replicated with expert and lay person groups, so differences due to 
expertise are not expected with regard to evaluations of the psychometric paradigm 
dimensions. 
RQ1:   Will there be a main effect of emotional appeal on dread risk and 
knowledge risk? 
RQ2:   Will there be a main effect of message topic on dread risk and knowledge 
risk? 
RQ3:   Will there be an interaction of emotional appeal and message topic such  
that varying combinations of emotional induction and message topic type 
yield different dread risk and knowledge risk? 
To date the effects of discrete emotions that vary along certainty and control 
appraisals (anger and fear) on risk perceptions have been examined (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001), and risk perceptions regarding risks that vary along the psychometric paradigm’s 
dread and knowledge factors have been studied (Seigrist, Keller, & Kiers, 2005; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Slovic, 1897), but the potential interaction of 




been explored.  Furthermore the research on experts and lay people (Hanson et al., 2003; 
Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 1992; Lazo, Kinnel, & Fisher, 2003; Slovic, 1987) has not 
considered the effect of induced emotion, and the research on induced emotion (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001) has not compared experts and lay people.   
 Certainly existing literature on the psychometric paradigm and emotion makes a 
strong argument that expertise, the psychological space in which a risk exists, and 
induced emotion influence risk perception.  The relationship between these variables, 
however, is unknown—yet essential to successful risk communication efforts.  Through 
an influence on the factors of the psychometric paradigm, messages have the potential to 
influence the position of a risk in the psychometric paradigm’s factor space, ultimately 
increasing or decreasing risk perceptions in the process.  Such a finding would 
substantially extend the original theory and situate the psychometric paradigm as a 
communication theory providing practical direction for the development of successful 
risk communication messages. 
 In summary, this study will test the following hypotheses and research questions: 
  
Table 3.  Summary of Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Summary of Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Hypothesis/Research Question Replication? 
H1a:  There will be a main effect of expertise, such that experts will report   
         lower risk perceptions than lay people.  
 
H1b:  There were be a main effect of expertise such that experts who  
         evaluate a risk within their domain of expertise will have more    
         accurate risk perceptions that lay people and experts for whom the   




H2a:   Women’s risk perceptions will be higher than men’s risk   






H2b:   The relationship between expertise and risk perceptions will be  




H3:  There will be a main effect of emotional appeal, such that   
            participants who read the message targeting fear will report higher   
            risk perceptions than those who read the message targeting anger. 
 
Yes 
H4a:   There will be a main effect for expertise on expressed fear such  
            that lay people will  report more fear than experts. 
 
H4b:   There will be a main effect for expertise on expressed anger such    




H5:    There will be a 2-way interaction of risk domain (nuclear, traffic)   
          and expertise (lay people, traffic experts, nuclear experts, general  
          risk assessors) such that experts reading an emotional appeal   
          regarding a risk outside of their domain will report higher levels of  
          the intended emotion (i.e., fear for the fear appeal) relative to   
          experts evaluating a risk within their domain. 
 
No 
RQ1:   Will there be a main effect of emotional appeal on dread risk and  
             knowledge risk? 
 
No 
RQ2:   Will there be a main effect of message topic on dread risk and  
             knowledge risk? 
 
No 
RQ3:   Will there be an interaction of emotional appeal and message topic  
            such that varying combinations of emotional induction and  








Chapter 3:  Methodology  
 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, the method of the study is described, 
including the participants, study design, procedures, and instrumentation. 
Participants 
 
 A sample of 560 people was recruited, targeting three types of expertise—traffic 
safety, nuclear energy, risk assessment—and lay people.   The sample consisted of 22 
percent traffic safety experts (n = 124), 23 percent nuclear energy experts (n = 129), 13 
percent risk assessment experts (n = 70), and 42 percent lay people (n = 237).  Fifty-one 
percent of the total sample were male (n = 285), 26 percent were female (n = 145), and 
23 percent (n = 130) chose not to disclose their biological sex.  The mean age fell in the 
40-49 years old group (15%; n = 84), with ages ranging from 18 to 60 years of age [18-20 
years old (1%), 21-29 years old (18%), 30-39 years old (10%), 50-59 years old (19%) and 
60 and older (7%)].  Sixty-eight percent of the participants were white (n = 382), one 
percent black or African American (n = 4), one percent Asian (n = 3), less than one 
percent Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (n = 1), and the remaining participants (30%; 
n = 167) did not respond to this demographic question.  Time in field ranged from less 
than one year to 20 years or more, with a mean of 15-19 years in field.  Education ranged 
from high school or equivalent to graduate degree with most participants holding a 
bachelor’s degree (n = 169).  No incentive was provided for participation.   
A snowball sampling technique was utilized to obtain each type of expertise in 
this difficult to reach population.  Snow ball sampling, i.e., network sampling, is a 
recruitment technique that utilizes an initial group of participants’ social networks to gain 




participant group consisted of personal contacts of the authors’ (n = 20).  Each participant 
was asked to both participate in the study and forward the invitation to contacts in their 
own networks, targeting people with as little overlap as possible among their contacts 
(i.e. only one person from a baseball team, or one coworker, rather than five contacts 
from a single common activity)—both requesting participation and asking these contacts 
to forward the invitation as well.   
The expert sample was recruited through a slightly different method given that 
specific expertise was sought.  First, personal contacts in each of the expertise groups 
(nuclear, traffic, and general risk assessors) were contacted via email with an invitation to 
participate in the study.  Again, these participants were asked to pass along the invitation 
letter to others in their field that might be willing to participate by simply forwarding the 
electronic invitation.  Second, professional organizations and societies (Table 4) in each 
area of expertise were contacted via electronic mail.  Contacts at these organizations were 
invited to participate as well as asked to use their listserv(s) and/or personal contacts to 
distribute the invitation further.  Each contact in this initial group of people was asked to 
forward the survey electronically to other people in his or her particular area of expertise.  
Most of the organizations agreeing to forward the study invitation did not or would not 
disclose how many people were on their listserv.  Further, many of the organizations did 
not provide an indication of whether or not they were willing to distribute the invitations.  
Therefore, it is impossible to know with accuracy how many people received the 
invitation to participate in the study.   





Table 4:  Professional Organizations Contracted for Study Recruitment 
Organization Response 
Nuclear Energy 
Nuclear Energy Institute Directed to contacts at other organizations. 
Women in Nuclear No response. 
Dominion Nuclear Agreed to distribute. 
Traffic Safety 
AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety Agreed to distribute. 
National Highway Transportation Safety 
Board 
No response. 
Department of Transportation, Traffic 
Operations-Traffic Safety 
Agreed to distribute. 
American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officers 
No response. 
Federal Highway Administration Agreed to distribute. 
Network of Employers for Traffic Safety No response. 




Society for Risk Analysis No response. 
UMD center Agreed to distribute. 
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis No response. 
Professional Risk Managers’ International 
Association 
Agreed to distribute. 
Toxicology Excellence for Risk 
Assessment   
No response. 
Environmental Protection Agency No response. 
CHEMRISK No response. 




Risk Assessment and Policy Association No response. 








 A 4 (Type of expertise:  risk assessor, nuclear energy expert, traffic safety expert, 
lay person) x 2 (Type of risk:  nuclear energy, automobile accident) x 2 (Type of 
emotional appeal:  fear, anger) independent groups design was employed (Table 5).  
Participants were randomly assigned to the emotional appeal condition and the topic 
domain condition.  The domain expertise is a quasi-experimental factor.  The resulting 
conditions are as depicted in Table 5:      
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 The experiment was created with the Survey Monkey tool (see 
www.surveymonkey.com) and distributed electronically.  Potential participants were 
invited to participate in the study via email.  Upon following the link to the study, 
participants first completed the consent form and indicated they wished to participate in 
the study.  They were first asked questions about the profession in which they work so 
that they could be grouped by profession (traffic safety, nuclear energy, risk assessment, 
or other) to be randomly assigned to condition.  This grouping assured a relatively even 
distribution across conditions for each type of expert.    
 Participants were randomly assigned to message condition by the month in which 
they were born (e.g., people born in May were assigned to experimental condition nuclear 
energy, fear).  Next, participants read the emotional message corresponding to their 
condition—either a traffic safety message targeting anger, a traffic safety message 
targeting fear, a nuclear energy message targeting anger, or a nuclear energy message 
targeting fear.  Manipulation checks for these conditions will be described in the results 
chapter of this dissertation.   
 Participants were prompted to ―click continue‖ to indicate they were finished 
reading the message, and were subsequently taken to a page asking them to write a brief 
essay or statement regarding their emotional reaction to the risk targeted in their 
condition, either traffic safety or nuclear energy.  It has been shown that asking 
participants to write about a particular emotion further induces the emotion (Lerner & 




anger conditions were asked to write about an aspect of the risk in question that made 
them angry, specifically: 
The article you just read addressed a risk associated with [nuclear energy or 
traffic accidents]. [Nuclear energy or Traffic accidents] evokes a lot of emotions 
in Americans. We'd like to get a sense of how [nuclear energy or traffic accidents] 
makes you feel. We are particularly interested in what makes you most angry 
about [nuclear energy or traffic accidents]. Please describe in detail what angers 
you about [nuclear energy or traffic accidents], or perhaps what angers you about 
how people communicate about [nuclear energy or traffic accidents]. If you can, 
write the description so that someone reading it might even feel angry from 
learning about the situation.  What aspect of nuclear energy makes you the most 
angry? Why does it make you so angry? 
 Participants in the fear conditions were asked to describe an aspect of the risk that made 
them scared, using the same instructions as above only substituting the word ―scared‖ for 
―angry.‖
1
   
 Next, participants in all conditions were asked to continue completing the 
questionnaire which assessed evaluations of the subjective ―riskiness‖ of 30 activities and 
technologies (Slovic, 1987).  The survey continued with more specific questions 
regarding risk characteristics related to the dimensions of the psychometric paradigm.  
The questionnaire concluded with questions to assess demographics.  The entire 
procedure took approximately fifteen minutes.   
                                                 
1
 These instructions were used in Lerner et al. (2003) and were replicated by this author 





 Four mock news articles were used—one for each condition, to induce emotion 
and topic domain.  The articles varied first in the emotional induction, with two articles 
targeting an anger response and two articles targeting a fear response.  The articles also 
varied in topic, with two articles focusing on a nuclear energy risk and two articles 
focusing on a traffic safety risk.  The aesthetic layout of the articles was the same for all 
four conditions, and the content remained similar for the pair of articles for each risk with 
the elements of certainty and control (identified by Smith & Ellsworth as crucial in 
distinguishing fear and anger) highlighted in the articles differing to produce the targeted 
emotion.  The stimulus materials can be found in Appendix A. 
Measures 
Expertise 
Expertise was measured by self-reported selection of specialized knowledge.  
Participants were first instructed to indicate whether or not they were considered an 
expert in their field.  They were then asked to indicate the field in which they work:  
nuclear energy, traffic safety, risk assessment, or other area (e.g. nursing, marketing, or 
teaching).  Participants also had the option to choose ―other‖ and describe their area of 
expertise.  Those who did not indicate expertise in traffic safety, nuclear energy, or risk 
assessment were all considered lay people for this dissertation.    
Emotional response  
 To ensure the emotional inductions were successful, participants in all conditions 
evaluated their experience of the two basic emotions of interest here, fear and anger.  




(1) ―none of this feeling‖ and (7) ―a great deal of this feeling.‖  Anger was measured with 
three items: angry, mad, and enraged.  These three items were submitted to a principal 
components analysis with varimax rotation.  The results showed a one-factor solution 
explaining 78% of the variance, but the enraged item had a much weaker loading than the 
other two items (0.80 compared to > 0.90).  The principal components analysis was 
adjusted to include only angry and mad.  The results indicated a one-factor solution 
explaining 92% of the variance (both factor loadings > 0.95).  Therefore, these two items 
were averaged to form an index for expressed anger (Cronbach’s α = 0.91).   
Fear was assessed with three items:  frightened, scared, and fearful.  These three 
items were submitted to a principal components analysis with varimax rotation.  The 
results showed a one-factor solution explaining 86% of the variance, (all factor loadings 
> 0.91).  Therefore, these three items were averaged to form an index for expressed fear 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.91).   
Risk Perceptions 
Based on Johnson and Tversky (1983) general subjective risk perceptions were 
measured regarding 19 distinct risks:  breast cancer, skin cancer, lung cancer, leukemia, 
heart disease stroke, fire, electrocution, airplane accidents, traffic accidents, nuclear 
accidents, toxic chemical spills, climate change, tornadoes, floods, accidental falls, war, 
homicide, and terrorism. Notably, these risks vary with regard to Slovic’s (1987) hazard 
dimensions of dread and knowledge and include the two risks utilized in the message 
stimuli.  Using a seven-point Likert scale, participants were asked to ―estimate your level 
of worry or concern about the following risks‖ (1 = not worried at all, 7 = very worried).   




The questions published in the original psychometric paradigm article Slovic, 
Ficshhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979) were used to assess voluntariness, novelty, dread, extent 
known to science, extent known to those exposed, extent the effects are delayed, potential 
for catastrophic consequences, and likelihood the consequences are fatal [the factors].  
These were 7-point Likert-type scales.  Since this hypothesis was based on the original 
research conducted on the psychometric paradigm, the methods employed in that study to 
create the factors were replicated as closely as possible, based on personal 
communication with Slovic (2011).  
First, correlations were calculated across risks, and this correlation matrix was 
factor analyzed.  Slovic (personal communication, 2011) specified that the factors be 
orthogonal (un-correlated).  Based on this direction, confirmatory factor analyses were 
conducted for both knowledge and dread risk.  The following criteria were used to assess 
model fit: nonsignificant chi-squared (Ong & Van Dulmen, 2007), IFI greater than 0.90 
(Hoyle & Panter, 1995), RMSEA lower than 0.08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1992), and SRMR 
lower than 0.08 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996).  
For knowledge risk, the overall model was found to be a very poor fit with these 
data (χ
2
 = 42.42, p < 0.01; IFI = 0.76, RMSEA = 0.00; SRMR = 0.14).  Based on the 
parameter estimates and standard error for each item, it was determined that the ―known 
to exposed‖ items should be dropped as the z scores were well below the 1.96 cutoff 
(Suhr, 2006) for significance at p < 0.05 (znuclear energy = 0.16 and ztraffic accident = 0.73 
respectively).  This revised model was an acceptable fit (χ
2
 = 3.36, p = 0.95; IFI = 0.89, 
RMSEA = 0.00; SRMR = 0.08).  When a scale was created, the scale was found to have 




was therefore decided that a scale should not be created for knowledge risk, and each 
individual item (i.e., question in the scale) would be analyzed separately for the research 
questions that dealt with knowledge and dread risk. 
A second confirmatory factor analysis was conducted for dread risk, and this 
model was found to be a poor fit with these data as well (χ
2
 = 58.19, p < 0.01; IFI = 0.69, 
RMSEA = 0.00; SRMR=0.16).   After examining parameter estimates and standard error 
values for each item, the voluntary variables were first dropped from the model (znuclear 
energy = 0.19 and ztraffic accident = 0.11 respectively).  Though this improved the fit of the 
model, it still did not produce an acceptable fit.  Again based on the parameter estimates 
and standard error values for each item, the dread variables were dropped from the model 
(znuclear energy = 1.21 and ztraffic accident = 0.34 respectively).  This produced an acceptable fit 
(χ
2
=2.35, p = 0.98; IFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.00; SRMR = 0.07).  However, the scale 
creation revealed that dread risk had poor reliability both for traffic accidents (α = 0.11) 
and nuclear energy (α = 0.16).  A scale was not created for dread risk, and each item will 
be analyzed individually for the research questions that dealt with knowledge and dread 





Chapter 4:  Results 
 
 In this chapter the results of the study are presented.   The chapter begins with a 
description of the manipulation checks for fear and anger.  The results for the hypotheses 
and research questions are then detailed.  All hypotheses were one-tailed, and the results 
reflect one-tailed significance testing throughout. 
Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation Check:  Fear 
 An independent samples t-test was performed to ascertain the effect of the fear 
induction on experienced fear.  Emotion condition was used as the independent variable, 
and experienced fear was used as the dependent variable (the experienced fear scale 
included fearful, scared, and frightened as stated in the explanation of measures in 
Chapter 3).  The results indicated that the effect of the fear induction was statistically 
significant, t(423) = 9.98, p < 0.01 .  The individuals in the fear condition experienced 
more fear (M = 1.83; SD = 1.16) than individuals in the anger condition (M = 1.53; SD = 
0.97).  Based on these results it was concluded that the effect of the fear induction on 
experienced fear was successful. 
Manipulation Check:  Anger 
 An independent samples t-test was performed to ascertain the effect of the anger 
induction on experienced anger.  Emotion condition was used as the independent 
variable, and experienced anger was used as the dependent variable (the experienced 
anger scale included anger and mad as stated in the explanation of measures in Chapter 
3).  The results indicated that the effect of the anger induction was statistically 




more anger (M = 1.91; SD = 1.42) than individuals in the fear condition (M = 1.70; SD = 
1.18).  Based on these results it was concluded that the effect of the anger induction on 
experienced anger was successful. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1 
 The first hypothesis predicted the well-cited finding of a main effect of expertise 
such that experts would report lower risk perceptions than lay people.  To test this 
hypothesis, an independent samples t-test was conducted to explore the differences 
between all experts (across domains) in the sample and all lay people.  These data 
indicated that in the case of three particular risks, climate change t(466) = -1.83, p < 
0.001, nuclear energy t(466) = -2.80, p < 0.001, and homicide t(465) = -1.51, p < 0.01, 
expert and lay person risk perceptions differed in the expected direction.  Differences 
between expert and lay person risk perceptions were not statistically significant when 
evaluating the remaining risks (Table 7).  Hypothesis 1 is partially supported by these 
data.   
 Because the results were not as clear cut as would be expected from the 
psychometric paradigm literature, a selection of cases was chosen to most closely 
replicate the original Slovic study (Slovic, 1987) upon which the assumption of this 
hypothesis has developed.  For this test, only risk assessment experts were chosen as 
―experts‖ and only female lay people were used for the lay group (to mimic the League of 
Women Voters group used as the lay group in the initial Slovic study).  An independent 
samples t-test revealed a similar pattern found as when the entire sample was analyzed:  




war t(184) = -2.00, p < 0.001, leukemia t(185) = -0.56, p < 0.05, homicide t(185) = -0.51, 
p < 0.01, and electrocution t(184) = 2.82, p < 0.01 but not others.  Oddly, for 
electrocution, experts (M = 1.98, SD = 1.24) actually displayed higher risk perceptions 
than lay people (M = 1.55, SD = 0.83).  These results can be found in Table 8.   
 Differences between the experts with a particular domain expertise, the general 
risk assessors, and lay people were explored next.  Here, it was expected that those with 
domain expertise would have the lowest risk perceptions (when assessing the risk within 
their domain) relative to others.  First, a univariate ANOVA was conducted with 
perception of nuclear energy risk as a function of domain expertise (F(3, 464) = 7.02, p < 
0.001).  In the case of nuclear energy, nuclear energy experts reported lower risk 
perceptions (M = 1.54, SD = 0.69) than the other three groups, traffic experts (M = 1.82, 
SD = 1.17), risk assessors (M = 2.22, SD = 1.35), and lay people (M = 2.12, SD = 1.39), 
which did not significantly differ from each other.   
This procedure was repeated for traffic accident risk (F(3, 462) = 4.25, p < 0.01).  
For traffic accidents the differences lied between traffic experts (M = 4.14, SD = 1.62) 
and nuclear experts (M = 3.55, SD = 1.58) and between traffic experts and lay people (M 
= 3.46, SD = 1.55), with traffic experts demonstrating higher risk perceptions than the 
other two groups.   
When the dependent variable consisted of out of domain risks the results were 
mixed.  Results from the univariate ANOVA, along with post-hoc (Scheffe’s) tests, 
revealed that for climate change the differences lied between lay people (F(3, 464) = 
4.13, p < 0.01; M = 2.58, SD = 1.73) and nuclear energy experts as well as between risk 




nuclear energy experts displaying lower risk perceptions than the other two groups.  
Heart disease risk perceptions varied between the risk assessors and the other three 
groups F(3, 465) = 3.40, p < 0.01.  Risk assessors (M = 3.65, SD = 1.71) reported higher 
risk perceptions than nuclear energy experts (M = 3.15, SD = 1.57), traffic experts (M = 
2.79, SD = 1.55), and lay people (M = 3.15, SD = 1.74).  The difference between traffic 
experts and lay people as well as nuclear energy experts was also statistically significant.   
When evaluating electrocution risks, the difference was between traffic experts 
and lay people compared to nuclear energy experts and risk assessors, F(3, 463) = 4.48, p 
< 0.01.  Traffic experts (M = 1.61, SD = 0.92) and lay people (M = 1.61, SD = 0.92) 
reported lower risk perceptions than nuclear energy experts (M = 1.97, SD = 1.16) and 
risk assessors (M = 1.98, SD = 1.24).  Finally, when considering accidental falls, risk 
assessors (M = 2.87, SD = 1.49) reported higher risk perceptions than lay people (M = 
2.25, SD = 1.41) and traffic experts (M = 2.30, SD = 1.40) who did not differ significantly 
from each other F(3, 463) = 3.73, p < 0.01.  The results further indicated that different 
types of experts display different risk perceptions depending on the topic of the risk 
evaluation. 
Hypothesis 2 
 This two part hypothesis explored the effect of biological sex on risk perceptions.  
First, it was expected that the risk perceptions of women would be higher than the risk 
perceptions of men regardless of expertise domain or message topic domain.  An 
independent samples t-test revealed that women did report higher risk perceptions than 
men for most risks:  climate change t(426) = 2.01, p < 0.05, terrorism t(423) = 3.56, p < 




< 0.01, airplane t(427) = 3.47, p < 0.001, nuclear t(426) = 3.81, p < 0.001, chemical spills 
t(425) = 2.07, p < 0.05, heart disease t(427) = 0.86, p < 0.05, leukemia t(426) = 1.80, p < 
0.01, stroke t(423) = -2.06, p < 0.01, homicide t(425) = -2/59, p < 0.001, electrocution 
t(425) = 2.83 p < 0.01.  The difference was in the expected direction except for in the 
case of electrocution for which men reported higher risk perceptions than women.  
Differences for accidental falls, lung cancer, stomach cancer, and traffic accidents, and 
floods were not statistically significant.  Means and standard deviations for all risks are 
reported in Table 10. 
 Next, it was expected that biological sex would attenuate the relationship between 
expertise and risk perceptions.  Separate ANCOVAs were conducted for each of the 
risks.  Here, the independent variable was domain expertise, the covariate was biological 
sex, and the dependent variable was the risk assessed.  A statistically significant main 
effect of expertise was consistent with the data for all risk types.  For all of these risks 
measured in this dissertation, adding biological sex to the ANOVA model reduced the 
effect of expertise on risk perceptions.  For climate change the effect was attenuated but 
remained statistically significant, F(3, 420) = 7.38, p < 0.05 (compared to p < 0.01 
without controlling for biological sex). For the other risks for which an effect was 
initially found, the effect was no longer statistically significant when controlling for sex.  
For risks that did not differ by expertise before controlling for biological sex, the effect of 
expertise remained nonsignificant.  Means and significance levels for all risks can be 
found in Table 11.   
Hypothesis 3 




A main effect of emotional appeal was expected such that participants who read the 
message targeting fear would report higher risk perceptions than those who read the 
message targeting anger.  An independent samples t-test revealed that statistical 
differences in the expected direction approached statistical significance for fire and 
stroke risks, with participants reading the fear-inducing message (Mfire = 2.59, SDfire = 
1.54; Mstroke = 2.78, SDstroke = 1.66 respectively) reporting higher risk perceptions than 
participants reading the anger-inducing message (Mfire = 2.41, SDfire = 1.39; Mstroke = 2.64, 
SDstroke = 1.51).  Emotional appeal had no effect on the other risks (Table 12).   
Correlations between each of the judged risks and expressed emotion were also 
examined.  Fear was positively correlated with each of the judged risks such that more 
fear led to high risk perceptions.  Anger was also positively correlated for all but two 
risks (war and terrorism) such that more anger led to higher risk perceptions.  The 
differences between these correlations were also tested.  For terrorism, war, fire, airplane 
accidents, nuclear energy, chemical spills, leukemia, and lung cancer, the positive 
relationship between fear and risk perceptions was statistically stronger than that of the 
anger and risk perception relationship.  For the other risks, the difference between the 
correlation was not statistically significant but was observed in the expected direction.  
The full correlation matrix can be reviewed in Table 13.    
Hypothesis 4 
 The two parts of Hypothesis 4 considered the relationship between expertise and 
expressed emotion.  First it was predicted that there would be a main effect for expertise 
on expressed fear such that lay people would report a greater amount of fear than experts, 




SD = 0.96) reported less fear than lay people (M = 1.80, SD = 1.19), t(423) = 2.34, p < 
0.01).  A univariate ANOVA indicated that the relationship between expertise and 
expressed fear was significant F(3, 421) = 2.55, p < 0.05.  Lay people did demonstrate 
the highest level of fear (M = 1.80, SD = 1.19), but this group did not differ significantly 
from the traffic expert group (M = 1.71, SD = 1.12).  Together these two groups were 
significantly higher than the nuclear energy expert group (M = 1.47, SD = 0.86) and the 
risk assessor group (M = 1.53, SD = 0.92), which did not differ significantly from each 
other. 
 Similarly it was expected that there would be a main effect for expertise on 
expressed anger such that lay people would report a greater amount of anger than experts.  
An independent samples t-test indicated that there was not a significant difference 
between the expert (M = 1.83, SD = 1.33) and lay person (M = 1.80, SD = 1.31) groups 
t(464) = 0.02, p = 0.92.  When examining the differences for the various expert groups, a 
univariate ANOVA indicated that there was not a significant relationship between 
expertise and expressed anger F(3, 462) = 0.85, p = 0.24.  See Table 14. 
 Because biological sex was found to be a significant predictor of risk perceptions, 
the effect of biological sex was considered here in light of the weak findings with regard 
to the relationship between expertise and expressed emotion.  An independent samples t-
test revealed that biological sex affected both expressed anger t(419) = 0.54, p < 0.01 and 
expressed fear t(384) = 1.75, p < 0.001. Women expressed more anger (M = 1.87, SD = 
1.51) than men (M = 1.80, SD = 1.22), and women expressed more fear (M = 1.79, SD = 





 The final hypothesis predicted a two-way interaction of message topic (nuclear, 
traffic) and expertise (lay people, traffic experts, nuclear energy experts, and general risk 
assessors) on risk perceptions such that experts reading an emotional appeal regarding a 
risk outside of their domain would report higher levels of the message’s intended emotion 
(i.e., fear for the fear appeal) relative to experts evaluating a risk within their domain.  
The predicted differences were consistent with these data, and a univariate ANOVA 
showed the effects to be statistically significant for anger F(1, 139) = 2.49, p < 0.05 and 
fear F(1, 112) = 3.78, p < 0.05.
2
  Traffic experts who read an anger-inducing traffic 
message reported lower levels of anger (M = 2.06, SD = 1.58) than traffic experts who 
read an anger-inducing nuclear energy message (M = 2.22, SD = 2.07).  Similarly, 
nuclear energy experts who read an anger-inducing traffic message (M = 1.87, SD = 1.41) 
reported higher levels of anger than nuclear energy experts who read an anger-inducing 
nuclear energy message (M = 1.71, SD = 1.09).  
Traffic experts who received a fear-inducing traffic message reported less fear (M 
= 1.50, SD = 0.99) than traffic experts who viewed a fear-inducing nuclear message (M = 
2.04, SD = 1.36).  Similarly, nuclear energy experts who viewed a fear-inducing nuclear 
message reported less fear (M = 1.41, SD = 0.91) than nuclear energy experts who 
viewed a fear-inducing traffic message (M = 1.65, SD = 1.06).  These results support the 
hypothesis. 
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Research Question 1 
 Research question one examined whether or not there would be a main effect of 
emotion on knowledge and dread risk.  Because reliable scales could not be created for 
these factors as expected based on previous research, the individual measures of the 
psychometric paradigm were examined separately.  An independent samples t-test 
indicated the emotion manipulation had a significant effect on some of the measures of 
the psychometric paradigm. For the extent to which a risk was judged to be known to 
science, participants who read a fear-inducing message judged traffic accidents to be less 
known to science (M = 5.02, SD = 1.8) than those who saw an anger-inducing message 
(M = 5.09, SD = 1.58), t(424) = -0.48, p < 0.05.  For novelty, participants who viewed a 
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who viewed an anger message (M = 2.16, SD = 1.28), t(426) = 1.49, p < 0.05.  Emotion 
induction also had a statistically significant effect on the extent to which traffic accidents 
were judged to have catastrophic potential, t(428) = 2.52, p < 0.05, with participants who 
viewed fear messages judging traffic accidents as more potentially catastrophic (M = 3.92 
SD = 1.90) than those who viewed anger messages (M = 3.49, SD = 1.67). 
Research Question 2 
Research question two examined whether or not there would be a main effect of 
message topic on knowledge and dread risk.  Because reliable scales could not be created 
for these factors as expected based on previous research, the individual measures of the 
psychometric paradigm were examined separately.  An independent samples t-test 
indicated the risk topic had a significant effect on some of the measures of the 
psychometric paradigm.  Message topic had a statistically significant effect on the extent 
to which both nuclear energy, t(428) = 2.66, p < 0.05, and traffic accidents, t(428) = -
1.67,  p < 0.05, were judged to have catastrophic potential.  For catastrophic potential of 
nuclear energy, participants who viewed a traffic accident message reported more 
catastrophic potential for nuclear energy (M = 4.79, SD = 1.85) than those who viewed a 
nuclear energy message (M = 4.30, SD = 1.98), t(428) = 2.66, p < 0.05.  A similar pattern 
was seen for traffic accidents, with participants viewing a traffic accident message 
reporting lower catastrophic potential for traffic accidents (M = 3.56, SD = 1.69) than 
those viewing a nuclear energy message (M = 3.85, SD = 1.90), t(428) = -1.67, p < 0.05.  
For dread ratings for nuclear energy, participants who viewed a nuclear energy message 
reported higher perceived dread (M = 4.83, SD = 1.50) than those who viewed a traffic 




Research Question 3 
Research question three examined a potential interaction effect of message topic 
and emotional induction on knowledge and dread risk.  Because reliable scales could not 
be created for these factors as expected based on previous research, the individual 
measures of the psychometric paradigm were examined separately.  Separate univariate 
ANOVAs were conducted with each item examined as a dependent variable, and the 
interaction was shown to be statistically significant for the perceived immediacy of 
effects for nuclear energy, the perceived voluntariness of traffic accidents, the perceived 
extent to which nuclear energy is known to those exposed, the extent to which both 
nuclear energy and traffic accidents were judged to be known to science, the perceived 
catastrophic potential of both nuclear energy and traffic accidents, and the likelihood of 
fatal consequences for nuclear energy.
3
   
First, a univariate ANOVA indicated that the interaction was statistically 
significant for the extent to which nuclear energy was judged to have immediate effects, 
F(1, 424) = 6.56, p < 0.01, with those in the nuclear energy, anger condition judging the 
effects of nuclear energy as more immediate (M = 3.01, SD = 1.61) than participants in 
the traffic accident, anger condition (M = 3.57, SD = 1.56), the nuclear energy, fear 
condition (M = 3.66, SD = 1.63) and the traffic accident, fear condition (M = 3.41, SD = 
1.74).   
Next, the interaction had a statistically significant effect on the perception of how 
voluntary traffic accidents are F(1, 425) = 3.21, p < 0.05.  Participants who viewed a 
traffic accident message did not vary significantly by type of emotional appeal, but those 
                                                 
3
 The results of additional regression analyses for each dependent variable are displayed in tables 22, 24, 




who viewed a fear appeal judged traffic accidents to be less voluntary (M = 4.98, SD = 
1.75) than those who viewed an anger appeal (M = 4.77, SD = 1.77).  For participants 
who viewed a nuclear energy message, those in the anger condition perceived traffic 
accidents to be more voluntary (M = 5.26, SD = 1.56) than those in the fear condition (M 
= 4.81, SD = 1.90).  Complete means and standard deviations for both nuclear energy and 
traffic accidents are shown in Table 21. 
Figure 4.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which the 
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Figure 5.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which the 
effects of traffic accidents are judged voluntary 
 
The effect of the interaction of message topic and emotional appeal on judgments 
of ―known to exposed‖ was examined next.  A univariate ANOVA indicated the effect 
was significant for nuclear energy F(1, 425) = 2.53, p < 0.05.  For participants who 
viewed a nuclear energy message, those in the anger condition reporting higher 
perceptions of nuclear energy being known to those exposed (M = 4.11, SD = 2.06) than 
those in the fear condition (M = 3.82, SD = 1.94).  The opposite was true for those who 
viewed traffic accident messages, with participants in the traffic accident, fear condition 
perceiving nuclear energy as more known to those exposed (M = 4.06, SD = 1.86) than 
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displayed visually in Figure 6, and means for the extent to which traffic accidents were 
judged to be known to those exposed are displayed in Table 25. 
The interaction was also found to effect evaluations of how known to science both 
nuclear energy and traffic accidents are.  For nuclear energy F(1, 424) = 2.31, p < 0.05, 
those who viewed a traffic accident message evaluated nuclear energy as less known to 
science in the anger (M = 5.51, SD = 1.22) condition compared to the fear condition (M = 
5.74, SD = 1.22).  The opposite effect was found for those who viewed nuclear energy 
messages, with those in the fear condition (M = 5.55, SD = 1.46) evaluating nuclear 
energy as less known to science than those in the anger condition (M = 5.70, SD = 1.31).  
This interaction is displayed in Figure 7. 
For the extent to which traffic accidents are judged to be known to science, F(1, 
422) = 12.60, p < 0.001, the same pattern was observed.  Participants who viewed a 
traffic accident message evaluated traffic accidents as more known to science when that 
message was a fear appeal (M = 5.35, SD = 1.45) than when that message was an anger 
appeal (M = 4.92, SD = 1.63).  On the other hand, those who viewed a nuclear energy 
fear appeal evaluated traffic accidents as less known to science (M = 4.70, SD = 2.04) 
than those who viewed a nuclear energy anger appeal (M = 5.44, SD = 1.44).  This 
interaction is shown in Figure 8, and complete results for both nuclear energy and traffic 





Figure 6.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which the 
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Figure 7.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which the 
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Figure 8.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which the 




The interaction was also statistically significant for the judgment of the 
catastrophic potential of both nuclear energy and traffic accidents.  A univariate ANOVA 
indicated that for nuclear energy F(1, 426) = 2.86, p < 0.05, those in the nuclear energy, 
anger condition judged the catastrophic potential as lower (M = 3.95, SD = 1.88) than 
those in the traffic accident, anger condition (M = 4.79, SD = 1.80), the nuclear energy, 
fear condition (M = 4.59, SD = 2.02) and the traffic accident, fear condition (M = 4.79, 
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Figure 9.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which 





A univariate ANOVA indicated the interaction was also significant for the 
judgment of the catastrophic potential of traffic accidents, F(1, 426) = 8.01, p < 0.01, 
with participants in the nuclear energy, fear condition judging the catastrophic potential 
of traffic accidents to be higher (M = 4.28, SD = 1.52) than participants in the traffic 
accident, fear condition (M = 3.54, SD = 1.28), the nuclear energy, anger condition (M = 
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Figure 10.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which 





A similar pattern was seen for the judgment of fatal consequences for nuclear 
energy, F(1, 424) = 2.52, p < 0.05, with those in the nuclear energy, anger condition 
judging nuclear energy to be less likely to have fatal consequences (M = 3.40, SD = 1.81) 
than those in the traffic accident, anger condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.82), the nuclear 
energy, fear condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.90) and the traffic accident, fear condition (M = 
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Figure 11.  The interaction of emotional appeal and message topic on extent to which 
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Chapter 5:  Discussion 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the differences in risk perceptions 
among experts and lay people.  In particular, this project aimed to address inconsistent 
definitions of ―expert‖ found in the existing literature and to test the predictions of the 
psychometric paradigm in the context of communication.  To examine these questions, 
this dissertation tested the effects of emotional appeals (anger, fear), message topic 
(nuclear energy, traffic accidents), and expertise (nuclear energy expert, traffic safety 
expert, risk assessment expert, and lay people) on risk perceptions and evaluation of risk 
characteristics.  The results replicated some findings of the existing research.  First, in the 
main, experts reported lower risk perceptions than lay people.  Further, expressed fear led 
to increased risk perceptions compared to expressed anger.  Both of these findings were 
consistent with previous research and were expected. 
This study also advanced theory of risk perception by documenting the varying 
effects of different types of expertise and by demonstrating the potential for message 
characteristics to affect both risk perceptions and the evaluation of risk characteristics, a 
possibility not previously tested.  The findings indicated that emotional appeals 
(augmented by a response statement) and message topic can affect evaluations of risk 
characteristics for both risks related to the message and risks unrelated to the message.  
These effects for risk characteristics were in fact more prominent than the effects of 
message characteristics on general risk perceptions.  The results suggest the factors 
argued to be predictive of risk perception (dread risk and knowledge risk) can be altered 
through strategic communication.  Given the pervasive effect of emotion documented in 




effect has not been previously demonstrated in the context of the psychometric paradigm.  
These results are further discussed below. 
 The first hypothesis tested the traditional expert-lay person risk perception 
predictions and confirmed that experts did perceive less risk than lay people, for risks that 
showed a statistically significant difference (climate change, nuclear energy, and 
homicide).  The extended definition of expert was examined next, testing the differences 
between varying types of expertise and lay people.  Statistically significant differences 
between groups were found for nuclear energy, traffic accidents, climate change, heart 
disease, electrocution, and accidental falls.   
For the two risks that fell in the domain expertise of some of the experts (traffic 
accidents and nuclear energy), the expected differences were statistically significant.  For 
nuclear energy, the nuclear energy experts reported the lowest risk perceptions while for 
traffic accidents the traffic experts reported the highest means (though not statistically 
different from risk assessors), demonstrating the optimistic bias that was expected with 
traffic accidents.  These results were consistent with this dissertation’s expectations, and 
provide empirical documentation that the definition of ―expert‖ is influential in the effect 
found between expertise and risk perceptions.  A blanket statement that experts perceive 
risks different than lay people has dominated the literature, but these results suggest more 
care is needed in determining precisely what differences are present between what type of 
expert when judging what type of risk. 
For the risks that were out of domain for all experts, the typical patterns did not 
hold.  For electrocution and accidental falls, risk assessors and nuclear energy experts 




change, nuclear energy experts demonstrated the lowest risk perceptions, and for heart 
disease, risk assessors demonstrated the highest risk perceptions.  Overall, the specific 
type of expertise had varying effects on risk perceptions.  Though these risks were not 
specifically within the domain of any of these experts, the tangential relationship may 
have been enough to drive differing risk perceptions.   
For example, it seems plausible that nuclear energy experts would be more 
familiar with and aware of the risk associated with electrocution than other types of 
experts or lay people.  Further, in terms of climate change, nuclear energy is often 
discussed in relation to climate change, and this association could have influenced the 
emergence of the same pattern for climate change as emerged for nuclear energy.  In the 
case of heart disease, a risk clearly not in the domain of any certain type of expert and a 
very individual risk, the two types of domain experts and lay people underestimated the 
risk compared to risk assessors—again in line with existing research on optimistic bias.  
Overall, these results indicate that a broad definition of expert will produce the expected 
differences between experts and lay people, but that a more specific definition of expert 
will produce differences not only between experts and lay people but among the expert 
groups themselves.   
These data suggest a more specific definition of ―expert‖ is preferred.  
Specifically, expertise seems to be specialized knowledge in a subject area, acquired 
through professional training and education.  With regard to risk, expertise is domain 
specific—an ―expert‖ can only be defined as such when evaluating the specific topic in 




possess that guides their general evaluations but rather expertise is an acquired body of 
knowledge resulting from extensive experience in a particular domain. 
Further examining the expert-lay person relationship, hypothesis two revealed 
differences in biological sex that first replicated findings in existing research by showing 
women generally have higher risk perceptions than men even in expert groups.  These 
results also documented the strength of this relationship by demonstrating a statistically 
significant effect not only within groups but also between groups.  That is, when 
controlling for the effect of biological sex, the effect of expertise was greatly 
attenuated—in most cases to the extent that the relationship between expertise and risk 
perceptions was no longer significant when controlling for biological sex.  Though these 
data suggest a strong relationship between biological sex and risk perceptions, it should 
also be taken into consideration that the ethnicity of this study’s sample was not diverse.  
From this data alone, it cannot be gleaned for certain if the effect is truly between males 
and females in general, or between white males and white females—an effect that may 
not have been as strong had there been greater diversity—particularly in the male sample 
(see discussion of the ―white male effect‖ in Chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
Next, the effects of emotional induction were examined in relation to both risk 
perceptions and evaluations of risk characteristics (the factors identified in the 
psychometric paradigm research).  Surprisingly, the emotional induction conditions did 
not have a statistically significant effect on risk perceptions.  In fact, the effect only 
approached statistical significance in two cases (fire and stroke).  In these cases, the 
difference was in the expected direction, with those in the fear condition reporting higher 




interaction of domain expertise and emotion, the effect on risk perceptions was not 
statistically significant.  It is possible that the mean differences between the fear and 
anger conditions were not large enough to produce the expected results.  Though the 
procedure was pilot-tested, the mean emotion scores were very low.  This will be 
discussed further in the limitations section of this chapter. 
The effect of emotion as not completely absent, however, as demonstrated by the 
analysis of expressed emotion.  Expressed emotion, compared to emotional induction, 
was examined with hypotheses three and four.  The interaction effect of expertise and 
message topic was statistically significant on expressed emotion.  It was predicted that 
experts reading an emotional appeal regarding a risk outside of their domain would report 
higher levels of the message’s intended emotion (i.e., fear for the fear appeal) relative to 
experts evaluating a risk within their domain.  The expected differences were statistically 
significant for both expressed anger and expressed fear.  This finding supports the notion 
that experts are selectively suppressing the effect of emotion on risk judgments when 
faced with evaluating a risk with which they have training.  Furthermore, this finding 
opens the door to the possibility that lay people are also capable of learning to evaluate 
risks differently, should the motivation to do so exist.  This is also further evidence that 
experts and lay people do not generally evaluate risks differently but rather the choice of 
different information to apply to a risk evaluation depends on the type of background of 
the individual and the type of risk at hand. 
Further, expertise and biological sex were found to be statistically significant 
predictors of expressed emotion such that for fear, lay people demonstrated the greatest 




fear and greater anger than men.  Expertise did not affect expressed anger.  Correlations 
revealed that risk perceptions increased with expressed emotion in general and increased 
with higher expressed fear to a greater extent than they increased with higher expressed 
anger.  This suggests that although the message manipulations had weaker effects than 
expected, the expected differences between fear and anger were present even with low 
means reported for both.  Such a finding supports the previous research that different 
discrete emotions have differing effects on risk perceptions.  With the trend for increased 
emotion to correlate with increased risk perceptions, it is plausible that stronger 
emotional appeals that produced stronger means overall would have had the expected 
effect for emotional condition in addition to the expected effect for expressed emotion. 
Additional evidence that these emotional inductions were effective is shown in 
the examination of the effects on the evaluations of the psychometric paradigm items.  
Though the expected effect of emotional induction was not found for general risk 
perceptions, the emotional inductions were found to have a main effect on several of the 
psychometric paradigm factors.  The fear induction produced judgments of risk 
characteristics that were less known to science, more novel, and more potentially 
catastrophic compared to the anger induction.  This finding is consistent with the existing 
emotion research on risk perceptions as in this case fear produced more highly negative 
evaluations of risk characteristics. 
A main effect for message topic was also found for some of the factors of the 
psychometric paradigm.  Specifically, reading a message about a particular risk lowered 
the judgment of that risk’s catastrophic potential compared to reading a message about 




such that participants who read a nuclear energy message evaluated the catastrophic 
potential of nuclear energy to be lower than those who read a traffic accident message, 
and participants who read a traffic accident message evaluated the catastrophic potential 
of traffic accidents to be lower than those who read a nuclear energy message.  On the 
other hand, participants who viewed a nuclear energy message evaluated nuclear energy 
as more dreadful than participants who read a traffic accident message.  It is interesting 
that the type of risk would have opposite effects on two items that have been predicted to 
belong to a single factor—dread risk.  This could be related to the way the psychometric 
paradigm measures dread.  The item assessing dread does not address personal feelings of 
dread but rather addressed how dreadful ―people‖ find the risk.  It could be that reading a 
message about a risk reduces personal risk perceptions but an assumption remains that 
other people remain worried.  Future additions to the scale to include both personal and 
the perception of others’ risk perceptions would aid in clarifying this issue.  For risk 
communicators of traditional dreadful risks especially, though, it is promising that 
personal judgments of the dangers of a risk can be reduced through communication.  
The interaction between emotional appeal and message topic was also found to be 
statistically significant for most of the items addressing the psychometric paradigm.  
Participants in the nuclear energy, anger condition judged nuclear energy to have less 
immediate effects, to have lower catastrophic potential, and to be less likely to have fatal 
consequence than participants in the other three conditions.  In terms of the extent to 
which nuclear energy is known to exposed, both nuclear energy and traffic accidents are 
known to science, and traffic accidents are voluntary, participants who viewed a nuclear 




when the message was an anger appeal, with the opposite true for those who viewed a 
traffic safety message.  For the catastrophic potential of traffic accidents, participants in 
the nuclear energy, fear condition judged the catastrophic potential of traffic accidents to 
be greater than any of the other three conditions.   
These results are quite interesting for two reasons.  First, the expected difference 
between anger and fear is further demonstrated, to a large extent for message topics that 
address the risk being evaluated.  Second, this effect is shown to hold for unrelated risks, 
which is consistent with the emotion research on general risk perceptions.  These findings 
may suggest that comparative risk messages could be successful in increasing risk 
perceptions for typically low dread risks, such as traffic safety.   
Implications 
 This study has several important implications for future research directions.  
Although much research has examined the differences in risk perceptions between 
experts and lay people, the definition has been broad, and the underlying factors that are 
thought to explain such a difference have not been reproduced.  The results of this study 
indicate the now common-sense prediction, that expert and lay-person risk perceptions 
differ, is not as free of complication as has been previously presented in existing research.   
The predictions of the psychometric paradigm have endured for 30 years, and 
because they are so strongly established, were assumed by this dissertation to exist.  
Surprisingly, confirmatory factor analysis could not reproduce the expected factor 
groupings, and scale reliabilities further suggested that the factors could not be combined 
as predicted.  Attempts to replicate the original factor analysis results were made with the 
entire sample, with expertise coded as yes or no as in the original psychometric paradigm 




solution was found, with different items than expected grouping together.  With 
advancements in technology and changes in political environments, it seems plausible 
that this factor space could have evolved over time.  It is also noteworthy that though the 
factors identified in the early psychometric paradigm research are often cited both in 
research and practical guides on risk communication, these factors, and specifically the 
factor space they are thought to create, have not been replicated precisely.  Other authors 
who have explored the factors of dread risk and knowledge risk have called the factors by 
the same name but have arrived at them differently.   
For example, instead of measuring all of the qualitative characteristics proposed 
in the initial psychometric paradigm work, subsequent research has measures dread risk 
and knowledge risk with one item each (Barnett & Breakwell, 2001), or has stated simply 
that the factors found are ―similar‖ to those reported by Slovic (1987) without clear 
explanation of the analysis that took place or the items that produced the similar factors 
(Fife-Schaw & Rowe, 2000).  The data presented in this dissertation suggest a more 
careful exploration and replication of the factors themselves is called for.  Given the 
factors of knowledge risk and dread risk are the underlying explanatory function behind 
the differences between expert and lay person risk perceptions, it will be essential that 
future research re-examine the factors presented in the early psychometric paradigm 
research and re-establish the relationships among them. 
 A clearer understanding of how the factor space currently functions, coupled with 
extended knowledge of how communication can influence these factors, has the potential 
to greatly improve risk communication theory.  The results of this study suggest further 




warranted.  Emotional appeals, message topic, and the interaction of emotional appeal 
and message topic all affected evaluations of risk characteristics.  It would be useful to 
test whether these results could be replicated across all of the risks upon which the factor 
space was originally developed.  Theoretically, the findings of this study suggest it may 
be possible to move a risk in the factor space, and thus change the risk perceptions that 
are thought to be influenced by the space the risk occupies. In addition to being an 
exciting theoretical possibility, these results would be obviously relevant to practitioners 
in risk communication and message design.  Should a reliable pattern emerge regarding 
message features and the evaluation of risk characteristics, the current theory could move 
from a common-sense explanation to a prescriptive theory from which specific 
recommendations could be developed to identify action steps for targeting risk perception 
change. 
 Specifically, these data indicate appeals to emotion can influence evaluations of 
risk characteristics—and that the most effective emotion in altering these evaluations 
depends on the type of risk in question.  In terms of the type of risk, both the message 
topic and the evaluation topic are shown to be of importance.  For a risk that does not 
inherently produce an emotional response (as in the case of traffic accidents), a 
comparative approach in risk communication may be most effective.  Message topic 
affected evaluations of both message-relevant and message-irrelevant risks, and more 
mundane risks may be able to harness more dreadful risks’ power to engage audiences (as 
nuclear energy affected perceptions of traffic accidents in this project).  For historically 
emotionally-charged risks, such as nuclear energy, topic-relevant messages targeting 




potential and likelihood of fatal consequences—certainly promising evidence for risk 
communicators. 
Limitations 
 There are a few limitations of this dissertation.  First, the emotional inductions 
produced weak means for expressed anger and expressed fear.  Though emotion has been 
shown to be difficult to produce in a single message, especially out of the context of 
crisis (Lerner et al, 2003 reported a mean level of fear of terrorism of 3.46 for data 
collected two weeks after the September 11 attacks), these means were lower than 
expected given the procedures were pilot tested.  The topic of the messages could have 
played a role as these two risks in particular were not pre-tested; however, theoretically 
nuclear energy should have produced greater emotional responses than any of the other 
topics tested.  Nonetheless, effects for emotion condition were still found, suggesting 
stronger inductions could produce additional effects.  Furthermore, it is important to note 
that the emotional induction included both a message and a brief essay or statement.  
While this procedure has been shown to be effective and, in some cases, necessary, in 
producing measurable emotion in an experimental setting, the combination approach also 
makes it impossible to say whether the message itself or the induction as a whole 
produced the observed effects. 
 Second, there were limitations to the sample that could hopefully be improved 
upon in a larger (and most likely funded) effort to extend this research.  First, a snowball 
sample was utilized rather than a probability sample, and while this technique was a 
necessity for this project, it is not ideal due to the bias potentially introduced.  Although 




nonetheless had weaknesses in demographic composition.  The sample did have a fairly 
normal distribution of age and education and was nearly evenly split between males and 
females, but it was predominantly white.  Oversampling techniques may need to be 
utilized in future research to ensure differences between groups are not overly affected by 
the ―white male effect.‖   
Furthermore, participants self-selected into the study, and it is reasonable to think 
that people who were willing to participate may be different than those individuals who 
received an invitation but did not choose to participate.  Thinking about the differing 
types of experts in particular, traffic safety and nuclear energy experts struggle with the 
issue addressed in this project—expert and lay person differences—and several people in 
these groups expressed interest in the results.  They may have been more willing to 
participate because although there were no direct incentives for participation, the 
potential knowledge to be gained from the successful completion of the project had the 
potential to benefit them more directly than the general risk assessor and lay person 
groups.  
 Additionally, the missing data, particularly with regard to the demographic 
questions, indicated there could have been a fatigue effect.  However, participants with 
missing data did not differ significantly from those without missing data on the any of the 
key dependent variables in this project.  Though the demographic questions did appear at 
the end of the survey, they consisted of only four multiple choice items that could have 
been quickly answered.  It may have been more that participants saw the demographic 
questions as too personal, or that they simply did not want to reveal that information 




Finally, the message feature variations were limited due to the scope of this 
dissertation.  Future research should examine the effects of additional emotions, in 
particular to include positive emotions.  Limited research exists on positive emotions in 
general and even less exists on the potential interaction of emotion and expertise.  
Further, only two topics were used in this dissertation.  Though it is encouraging that 
similar patterns seen across more than one topic and risk, it will be necessary to examine 
additional topics that fall in all quadrants of the psychometric paradigm space (whatever 
that space may look like after the factors are first re-examined).   
 In conclusion, this study was a successful attempt at examining the effects of 
message characteristics (emotional appeal and topic) on risk perceptions and evaluations 
of risk characteristics.  The results replicated the findings of existing research on expert 
and lay person differences (as well as extended the understanding of the effects of 
expertise definition).  To a limited extent, the data replicated the expected difference 
between fear and anger inductions, though most of the evidence in this data lies in 
expressed fear and expressed anger.  In addition, this study advanced the theory of risk 
perception by examining the effect of communication, and specifically message features, 
on risk perceptions and evaluations of risk characteristics.  In sum, the present study is 
important for both theorists and practitioners of risk communication and risk perceptions.  
Further research is needed, however, to continue examination of the psychometric 
paradigm factors themselves.  Additionally the generalizability of the findings of these 
data to a wider range of message topics and to additional message features shown to be 





Table 6.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Emotion Inductions 
 
 emotion Mean SD df t p 
expressed 
anger 
fear 1.70 1.18    
anger 1.91 1.42 464 5.45 < 0.05 
expressed 
fear 
fear 1.83 1.16    





Table 7.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Expertise on Risk 
Perceptions 
 Expertise Mean SD df t p 
Climate change expert 2.31 1.48 
   lay 2.58 1.73 466 -1.83 < 0.001* 
terrorism expert 3.14 1.62   
 
lay 3.20 1.68 463 -0.36 0.29 
war expert 2.91 1.55   
 
lay 2.96 1.67 465 -0.34 0.19 
tornadoes expert 2.21 1.35   
 
lay 2.05 1.27 465 1.29  0.09 
floods expert 2.15 1.36   
 
lay 2.29 1.41 466 -1.03 0.33 
fire expert 2.47 1.42   
 
lay 2.54 1.52 464 -0.50 0.32 
Airplane 
Accidents 
expert 2.12 1.35   
 
lay 2.27 1.38 467 -1.13 0.42 
Traffic 
Accidents 
expert 3.81 1.61   
 
lay 3.46 1.55 464 2.35 0.38 
Nuclear Energy expert 1.80 1.08   
 
lay 2.12 1.39 466 -2.80 <0.001** 
Chemical spills expert 1.99 1.28   
 
lay 1.90 1.22 465 0.76 0.95 
Heart Disease expert 3.14 1.63   
 
lay 3.15 1.74 467 -0.06 0.28 
leukemia expert 1.94 1.19   
 
lay 2.06 1.35 466 -0.94 0.07 
Stomach Caner expert 1.97 1.24   
 
lay 2.03 1.34 464 -0.43 0.39 
Lung Cancer expert 2.14 1.36   
 
lay 2.22 1.47 463 -0.59 0.37 
stroke expert 2.73 1.60   
 
lay 2.66 1.56 463 0.49 0.85 
homicide expert 1.92 1.17   
 
lay 2.10 1.45 465 -1.51 < 0.01* 
Electrocution expert 1.84 1.11   
 
lay 1.61 0.92 465 2.36 0.09 
Accidental Falls expert 2.55 1.47   
 
lay 2.25 1.41 465 2.25 0.14 
* p < 0.01 




Table 8.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Risk Assessors versus 
Female Lay People on Risk Perceptions 
 
 expertise Mean SD df t p 
climate risk assess 2.79 1.71 
   lay 2.55 1.67 185 0.94 0.93 
terrorism risk assess 2.89 1.47       
lay 3.61 1.76 183 -2.78 0.06 
war risk assess 2.90 1.35       
lay 3.40 1.71 184 -2.00 <0.001*** 
tornadoes risk assess 2.19 1.38       
lay 2.36 1.38 185 -0.81 0.69 
floods risk assess 2.22 1.35       
lay 2.39 1.44 185 -0.76 0.50 
fire risk assess 2.89 1.46       
lay 2.75 1.69 183 0.54 0.12 
airplane risk assess 2.37 1.44       
lay 2.48 1.46 185 -0.53 0.92 
traffic risk assess 3.79 1.60       
lay 3.86 1.65 184 -0.29 0.69 
Nuclear 
Energy 
risk assess 2.22 1.35       
lay 2.23 1.49 185 -0.02 0.42 
Chemical 
spills 
risk assess 2.30 1.38       
lay 2.10 1.43 185 0.90 0.65 
Heart disease risk assess 3.65 1.71       
lay 3.19 1.81 185 1.66 0.57 
leukemia risk assess 2.05 1.28       
lay 2.17 1.47 185 -0.56 <0.05* 
Stomach 
Cancer 
risk assess 2.02 1.34       
lay 2.05 1.40 184 -0.15 0.42 
Lung Cancer risk assess 2.42 1.44       
lay 2.26 1.52 184 0.69 0.96 
stroke risk assess 3.03 1.62       
lay 2.92 1.78 184 0.42 0.06 
homicide risk assess 2.11 1.17       
lay 2.23 1.60 185 -0.51 <0.01** 
electrocution risk assess 1.98 1.24       
lay 1.55 0.83 184 2.82 <0.01** 
Accidental 
Falls 
risk assess 2.87 1.49       
lay 2.20 1.50 184 2.89 0.96 
* < 0.05 
* p < 0.01 
** p < .001 
 





Table 9.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Domain Expertise on Risk 
Perceptions 
      
 
Mean SD df F p 
climate traffic 2.29 1.49    
nuclear energy 2.05 1.25    
risk assessment 2.79 1.71    
other (lay) 2.58 1.73    
Total 2.42 1.59 3, 464 4.130 < 0.01** 
terrorism traffic 3.07 1.59    
nuclear energy 3.35 1.71    
risk assessment 2.89 1.47    
other (lay) 3.20 1.68    
Total 3.17 1.64 3, 461 1.172 0.16 
war traffic 2.74 1.63    
nuclear energy 3.05 1.58    
risk assessment 2.90 1.35    
other (lay) 2.96 1.67    
Total 2.93 1.60 3, 463 .694 0.28 
tornadoes traffic 2.16 1.41    
nuclear energy 2.27 1.28    
risk assessment 2.19 1.38    
other (lay) 2.05 1.27    
Total 2.14 1.31 3, 463 .677 0.28 
floods traffic 2.08 1.45    
nuclear energy 2.18 1.29    
risk assessment 2.22 1.35    
other (lay) 2.29 1.41    
Total 2.21 1.38 3, 464 .501 0.34 
fire traffic 2.33 1.40    
nuclear energy 2.35 1.39    
risk assessment 2.89 1.46    
other (lay) 2.54 1.52    
Total 2.50 1.46 3, 462 2.263 p<0.05* 
airplane traffic 2.03 1.33    
nuclear energy 2.06 1.30    
risk assessment 2.37 1.44    
other (lay) 2.27 1.38    
Total 2.18 1.36 3, 465 1.321 0.13 
traffic traffic 4.14 1.62    
nuclear energy 3.55 1.58    
risk assessment 3.79 1.60    
other (lay) 3.46 1.55    
Total 
3.67 1.60 
3, 462 4.254 < 0.01** 




nuclear energy 1.54 0.69    
risk assessment 2.22 1.35    
other (lay) 2.12 1.39    
Total 1.93 1.23 3, 464 7.021 < 0.001*** 
Chemical 
spills 
traffic 1.87 1.27    
nuclear energy 1.92 1.23    
risk assessment 2.30 1.38    
other (lay) 1.90 1.22    
Total 1.96 1.26 3, 463 1.880 0.066 
Heart disease traffic 2.79 1.55    
nuclear energy 3.15 1.57    
risk assessment 3.65 1.71    
other (lay) 3.15 1.74    
Total 3.14 1.67 3, 465 3.397 <0.01** 
leukemia traffic 1.96 1.20    
nuclear energy 1.88 1.13    
risk assessment 2.05 1.28    
other (lay) 2.06 1.35    
Total 1.99 1.26 3, 464 .553 0.32 
Stomach 
cancer 
traffic 1.97 1.19    
nuclear energy 1.96 1.23    
risk assessment 2.02 1.34    
other (lay) 2.03 1.34    
Total 2.00 1.28 3, 462 .092 0.48 
Lung cancer traffic 1.92 1.26    
nuclear energy 2.17 1.38    
risk assessment 2.42 1.44    
other (lay) 2.22 1.47    
Total 2.17 1.41 3, 461 1.761 0.077 
stroke traffic 2.54 1.58    
nuclear energy 2.72 1.60    
risk assessment 3.03 1.62    
other (lay) 2.66 1.56    
Total 2.70 1.58 3, 461 1.289 0.14 
homicide traffic 1.75 1.18    
nuclear energy 1.96 1.17    
risk assessment 2.11 1.17    
other (lay) 2.10 1.45    
Total 2.00 1.30 3, 463 1.799 0.073 
electrocution traffic 1.61 0.92    
nuclear energy 1.96 1.16    
risk assessment 1.98 1.24    
other (lay) 1.61 0.92    
Total 1.75 1.04 3, 463 4.480 <0.01** 
Accidental 
falls 
traffic 2.30 1.40    
nuclear energy 2.58 1.49    
risk assessment 2.87 1.49    
other (lay) 2.25 1.41    
Total 2.42 1.45 3, 463 3.725 <0.01** 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 




Table 10.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Biological Sex on Risk 
Perceptions 
 
 sex Mean SD df t p 
climate male 2.30 1.47 
   female 2.62 1.71 426 2.01 <0.05* 
terrorism male 2.93 1.49   
 
female 3.51 1.74 423 3.56 <0.05* 
war male 2.69 1.47   
 
female 3.31 1.67 425 3.98 <0.05* 
tornadoes male 2.02 1.26   
 
female 2.34 1.38 425 2.41 <0.05* 
floods male 2.15 1.33   
 
female 2.34 1.44 426 1.38 0.14 
fire male 2.34 1.33   
 
female 2.76 1.63 425 2.82 <0.01** 
airplane male 2.03 1.28   
 
female 2.51 1.49 427 3.47 <0.001*** 
traffic male 3.52 1.51   
 
female 3.92 1.69 425 2.44 0.43 
nuclear male 1.76 0.98   
 
female 2.21 1.49 426 3.81 <0.001*** 
Chemical 
spills 
male 1.87 1.14   
 
female 2.13 1.42 425 2.07 <0.05* 
Heart disease male 3.11 1.57   
 
female 3.26 1.81 427 0.86 <0.05* 
leukemia male 1.91 1.17   
 
female 2.14 1.43 426 1.80 <0.01** 
Stomach 
cancer 
male 1.97 1.21   
 
female 2.01 1.35 425 -0.30 0.36 
Lung cancer male 2.12 1.34   
 
female 2.26 1.51 423 -0.96 0.17 
stroke male 2.60 1.50   
 
female 2.94 1.77 423 -2.06 <0.01** 
homicide male 1.89 1.13   
 
female 2.21 1.55 425 -2.49 <0.001*** 
electrocution male 1.85 1.13   
 
female 1.55 0.82 425 2.83 <0.01** 
Accidental 
falls 
male 2.49 1.41   
 
female 2.32 1.52 425 1.18 0.45 
* p < 0.05 
** p  < 0.01 





Table 11.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Domain Expertise on Risk 
Perceptions, Controlling for Biological Sex 
 
Mean SD df F p 
climate traffic 2.31 1.44    
nuclear energy 2.06 1.25    
risk assessment 2.71 1.71    
other (lay) 2.58 1.71    
Total 2.41 1.56 3, 420 7.38 < 0.05* 
terrorism traffic 3.04 1.50    
nuclear energy 3.29 1.65    
risk assessment 2.85 1.52    
other (lay) 3.15 1.64    
Total 3.13 1.60 3, 417 0.95 0.26 
war traffic 2.67 1.52    
nuclear energy 3.04 1.52    
risk assessment 2.86 1.39    
other (lay) 2.93 1.66    
Total 2.90 1.57 3, 419 .74 0.30 
tornadoes traffic 2.22 1.44    
nuclear energy 2.25 1.28    
risk assessment 2.11 1.38    
other (lay) 2.02 1.24    
Total 2.13 1.31 3, 419 1.83 0.16 
floods traffic 2.08 1.42    
nuclear energy 2.18 1.27    
risk assessment 2.16 1.32    
other (lay) 2.32 1.42    
Total 2.22 1.37 3, 420 1.10 0.24 
fire traffic 2.37 1.45    
nuclear energy 2.33 1.33    
risk assessment 2.84 1.45    
other (lay) 2.53 1.52    
Total 2.48 1.45 3, 419 0.71 0.31 
airplane traffic 2.07 1.39    
nuclear energy 2.06 1.31    
risk assessment 2.36 1.51    
other (lay) 2.28 1.35    
Total 2.19 1.37 3, 421 0.78 0.28 
traffic traffic 4.25 1.58    
nuclear energy 3.52 1.54    
risk assessment 3.66 1.59    
other (lay) 3.46 1.55    
Total 3.66 1.59 3, 419 3.17 0.10 
nuclear traffic 1.82 1.13    
nuclear energy 1.55 .70    
risk assessment 2.14 1.32    
other (lay) 2.10 1.36    






traffic 1.82 1.12    
nuclear energy 1.93 1.22    
risk assessment 2.36 1.43    
other (lay) 1.92 1.24    
Total 1.96 1.25 3, 419 1.87 .16 
Heart disease traffic 2.89 1.60    
nuclear energy 3.16 1.58    
risk assessment 3.59 1.68    
other (lay) 3.15 1.71    
Total 3.16 1.66 3, 465 2.09 .14 
leukemia traffic 2.00 1.23    
nuclear energy 1.86 1.13    
risk assessment 2.09 1.32    
other (lay) 2.03 1.35    
Total 1.99 1.27 3, 464 .26 0.43 
Stomach 
cancer 
traffic 1.96 1.17    
nuclear energy 1.96 1.22    
risk assessment 2.00 1.34    
other (lay) 1.99 1.30    
Total 1.98 1.26 3, 419 .011 0.48 
Lung cancer traffic 1.92 1.28    
nuclear energy 2.17 1.38    
risk assessment 2.40 1.42    
other (lay) 2.21 1.46    
Total 2.16 1.40 3, 461 1.53 0.19 
stroke traffic 2.64 1.62    
nuclear energy 2.74 1.61    
risk assessment 2.95 1.61    
other (lay) 2.66 1.59    
Total 2.72 1.60 3, 417 .36 0.39 
homicide traffic 1.77 1.19    
nuclear energy 1.94 1.11    
risk assessment 2.09 1.18    
other (lay) 2.11 1.46    
Total 2.00 1.29 3, 419 2.81 0.11 
electrocution traffic 1.65 .96    
nuclear energy 1.98 1.17    
risk assessment 1.89 1.22    
other (lay) 1.60 .91    
Total 1.75 1.04 3, 419 3.02 .10 
Accidental 
falls 
traffic 2.38 1.45    
nuclear energy 2.58 1.48    
risk assessment 2.77 1.43    
other (lay) 2.27 1.42    
Total 2.44 1.45 3, 419 3.32 .09 




Table 12.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Emotional Appeal on Risk 
Perceptions 
 
 emotion Mean SD df t p 
climate fear 2.3146 1.55394 
   anger 2.5098 1.61407 466 1.325 .515 
terrorism fear 3.2311 1.67739   
 
anger 3.1146 1.61550 463 .761 .607 
war fear 2.9194 1.61191   
 
anger 2.9375 1.59041 465 .121 .504 
tornadoes fear 2.0708 1.36985   
 
anger 2.2039 1.26646 465 1.090 .851 
floods fear 2.1038 1.31293   
 
anger 2.2969 1.42998 466 1.509 .171 
fire fear 2.5877 1.53550   
 
anger 2.4196 1.39473 464 1.237 .064 
airplane fear 2.2629 1.34809   
 
anger 2.1133 1.36872 467 1.187 .544 
traffic fear 3.7773 1.66552   
 
anger 3.5725 1.53234 464 1.380 .240 
nuclear fear 1.9953 1.31572   
 
anger 1.8784 1.14883 466 1.026 .365 
Chemical 
spills 
fear 1.9292 1.25048   
 
anger 1.9765 1.26407 465 .404 .475 
Heart disease fear 3.1362 1.67818   
 
anger 3.1484 1.67140 467 .079 .951 
leukemia fear 2.0329 1.32603   
 
anger 1.9569 1.19797 466 .651 .302 
Stomach 
cancer 
fear 1.9762 1.35350   
 
anger 2.0117 1.21585 464 -.298 .419 
Lung cancer fear 2.1374 1.46550   
 
anger 2.1969 1.35739 463 -.453 .517 
stroke fear 2.7725 1.66345   
 
anger 2.6378 1.51498 463 .913 .077 
homicide fear 1.9671 1.31172   
 
anger 2.0197 1.28675 465 .436 .694 
electrocution fear 1.7109 .98408   
 
anger 1.7773 1.08521 465 .687 .349 
Accidental 
falls 
fear 2.4057 1.40263   
 






Table 13.  Correlations for Expressed Emotion and Risk Perceptions 
 
 
rANGER rFEAR z 
Climate .096* .196*** -1.51 
Terrorism .071 .202*** -1.97* 
War .059 .171*** -1.67* 
Tornadoes .130** .232*** -1.56 
Floods .115** .192*** -1.16 
Fire .096* .230*** -2.03* 
Airplane 
Accident 
.150*** .288*** -2.14** 
Traffic 
Accident 
.261*** .268*** -0.11 
Nuclear 
Energy 
.163*** .296*** -2.07* 
Chemical 
Spill 
.133** .267*** -2.06* 
Heart disease .127** .171*** -0.66 
Leukemia .163*** .302*** -2.17* 
Stomach 
Cancer 
.151*** .230*** -1.21 
Lung cancer .105** .215*** -1.66* 
Stroke .139*** .188*** -0.74 
Homicide .171*** .241*** -1.08 
Electrocution .158*** .200*** -0.64 
Accidental 
Falls 
.121** .126* -0.07 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 






Table 14.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Expertise on Expressed 
Emotion 
 
 Expertise  Mean SD df t p 
expressed anger expert 1.83 1.33    
lay 1.80 1.31 464 0.2 0.92 
expressed fear expert 1.56 0.96    
lay 1.80 1.19 423 2.34 <0.01 
 
Expertise  Mean SD df F p 
Expressed anger traffic 1.96 1.51    
 nuclear 
energy 
1.68 1.14    
 risk 
assessment 
1.89 1.32    
 other (lay) 1.80 1.31 3, 462 0.85 0.24 
Expressed fear traffic 1.71 1.12    
 nuclear 
energy 
1.47 0.86    
 risk 
assessment 
1.53 0.92    





Table 15.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Biological Sex on 
Expressed Emotion 
 
 sex Mean SD df t p 
expressed 
anger 
male 1.80 1.22    
female 1.87 1.51 419 0.54 < 0.01 
expressed 
fear 
male 1.59 0.94    





Table 16.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of Message 
Topic and Expertise on Expressed Anger 
 
topic expertise Mean SD df F p 
traffic traffic 2.06 1.58 
   
 
nuclear 1.87 1.41 
   nuclear 
energy traffic 2.22 2.07 
   
 







Table 17.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of Message 
Topic and Expertise on Expressed Fear 
 
topic expertise Mean SD df F p 
traffic traffic 1.5 0.99 
   
 
nuclear 1.65 1.06 
   
nuclear 
energy traffic 2.04 1.36 
   
 













 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Expertise -.11 -1.01 -.29* -1.97 
Message Topic -.064 -.061 .11 .78 
Expertise*Message 
Topic 






Expertise -.029 .44 .26* -1.59 
Message Topic -.042 -.64 .22* 1.91 
Expertise*Message 
Topic 





* p < 0.05 
a. R
2
 change was statistically significant, F(1, 112) = 3.09, p < 0.05 
b. R
2





Table 19.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Emotional Appeal on 
Psychometric Paradigm Measures 
 emotion Mean SD df t p 
nuclear voluntary fear 3.63 1.69 
   anger 3.83 1.76 427 1.17 0.58 
nuclear immediate 
effects 
fear 3.54 1.69   
 
anger 3.38 1.60 426 1.01 0.28 
nuclear known to 
exposed 
fear 3.94 1.90   
 
anger 3.87 2.01 427 0.37 0.11 
nuclear known to 
science 
fear 5.64 1.34   
 
anger 5.57 1.25 426 0.54 0.86 
nuclear personal 
control 
fear 3.37 1.76   
 
anger 3.30 1.69 428 0.44 0.28 
nuclear novel fear 3.12 1.61   
 
anger 3.16 1.50 427 0.26 0.18 
nuclear catastrophic 
potential 
fear 4.69 1.98   
 
anger 4.50 1.87 428 1.00 0.46 
nuclear dread fear 4.70 1.60   
 
anger 4.58 1.73 426 0.71 0.15 
traffic voluntary fear 4.89 1.82   
 
anger 4.94 1.71 427 0.26 0.14 
traffic immediacy of 
effects 
fear 5.87 1.20   
 
anger 5.90 1.23 428 0.26 0.72 
traffic known to 
exposed 
fear 4.52 1.70   
 
anger 4.22 1.66 427 1.84 0.55 
traffic known to 
science 
fear 5.02 1.80   
 
anger 5.09 1.58 424 -0.48 <0.05* 
traffic personal control fear 4.39 1.68   
 
anger 4.44 1.60 428 0.30 0.36 
traffic novel fear 2.35 1.40   
 
anger 2.16 1.28 426 1.49 <0.05* 
traffic catastrophic 
potential 
fear 3.92 1.90   
 
anger 3.49 1.67 428 2.52 <0.05* 
traffic dread fear 3.67 1.71   
 
anger 3.50 1.68 394 1.01 0.94 
traffic fatal fear 5.44 1.41   
 
anger 5.57 1.24 395 -.99 0.07 






Table 20.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for Message Topic on 
Psychometric Paradigm Measures 
 
 topic Mean SD df t p 
nuclear voluntary traffic 3.67 1.72 427 -0.97 0.55 
nuclear 3.84 1.73   
 
nuclear immediate effects traffic 3.51 1.63 426 0.88 0.88 
nuclear 3.37 1.65   
 
nuclear known to exposed traffic 3.86 1.93 427 -0.45 0.36 
nuclear 3.95 2.00   
 
nuclear known to science traffic 5.60 1.22 426 -0.17 0.41 
nuclear 5.62 1.39   
 
nuclear personal control traffic 3.16 1.66 428 -2.51 0.09 
nuclear 3.58 1.78   
 
nuclear novel traffic 3.20 1.52 427 0.86 0.48 




traffic 4.79 1.85 428 2.66 <0.05* 
nuclear 4.30 1.98   
 
nuclear dread traffic 4.50 1.77 426 -2.02 <0.01** 
nuclear 4.83 1.50   
 
traffic voluntary traffic 4.85 1.76 427 -0.95 0.65 
nuclear 5.01 1.76   
 
traffic immediacy of 
effects 
traffic 5.86 1.19 428 -0.65 0.59 
nuclear 5.93 1.25   
 
traffic known to exposed traffic 4.19 1.64 427 -2.40 0.52 
nuclear 4.58 1.73   
 
traffic known to science traffic 5.08 1.57 424 0.32 <0.05* 
nuclear 5.03 1.83   
 
traffic personal control traffic 4.30 1.61 428 -1.87 0.73 
nuclear 4.59 1.66   
 
traffic novel traffic 2.24 1.29 426 -0.15 0.21 




traffic 3.56 1.69 428 -1.67 <0.05* 
nuclear 3.85 1.90   
 
traffic dread traffic 3.62 1.70 394 0.76 0.98 
nuclear 3.49 1.69   
 
traffic fatal traffic 5.49 1.24 395 -0.45 0.26 
nuclear 5.55 1.43   
 
* p < 0.05 





Table 21.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Voluntariness 
 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 3.61 1.68 
   
 
anger 3.71 1.76 
   nuclear 
energy fear 3.66 1.70 
   
 
anger 4.05 1.75 1 0.69 0.21 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 4.98 1.75 
   
 
anger 4.77 1.77 
   nuclear 
energy fear 4.81 1.90 
   
 







Table 22.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 




 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
-.065 -1.34 -.113 -1.50 












-.021 -.42 -.13* -1.72 









* p < 0.05 
a. R
2






Table 23.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Immediacy of Effects 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 3.41 1.74 
   
 
anger 3.57 1.56 
   nuclear 
energy fear 3.66 1.63 
   
 
anger 3.01 1.61 1, 424 6.56 <0.01 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 5.85 1.16 
   
 
anger 5.86 1.21 
   nuclear 
energy fear 5.89 1.24 
   
 






Table 24.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 





 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
0.057 1.16 .20* 2.66 












-.018 -.70 -.040 -.54 








* p < 0.01 
a. R
2






Table 25.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Extent Known to Exposed 
 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 4.06 1.86 
   
 
anger 3.74 1.97 
   nuclear 
energy fear 3.82 1.94 
   
 
anger 4.11 2.06 1, 425 2.53 <0.05* 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 4.30 1.64 
   
 
anger 4.12 1.64 
   nuclear 
energy fear 4.73 1.75 
   
 






Table 26.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 




 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
0.015 .31 -.075 -1.002 












.072 1.47 .095 1.27 








* p < 0.05 
a. R
2





Table 27.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Known to Science 
 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 5.74 1.22 
   
 
anger 5.51 1.22 
   nuclear 
energy fear 5.55 1.46 
   
 
anger 5.70 1.31 1, 424 2.31 <0.05 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 5.35 1.45 
   
 
anger 4.92 1.63 
   nuclear 
energy fear 4.70 2.04 
   
 







Table 28.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 





 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
0.026 1.33 -.061 -.81 












-.021 -.43 -.22* -2.97 









* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.001 
a. R
2
 change was statistically significant, F(1, 424) = 2.31, p < 0.05 
b. R
2





Table 29.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Personal Control 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 3.23 1.73 
   
 
anger 3.11 1.62 
   nuclear 
energy fear 3.51 1.78 
   
 
anger 3.66 1.78 1, 424 0.66 0.21 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 4.33 1.55 
   
 
anger 4.27 1.65 
   nuclear 
energy fear 4.45 1.80 
   
 






Table 30.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 





 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
0.002 .042 -0.044 -.59 











-.03 -.62 -.095 -1.27 














Table 31.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Novelty 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 3.14 1.59 
   
 
anger 3.23 1.48 
   nuclear 
energy fear 3.10 1.63 
   
 
anger 3.03 1.55 1, 424 0.28 0.30 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 2.32 1.28 
   
 
anger 2.19 1.30 
   nuclear 
energy fear 2.38 1.52 
   
 






Table 32.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 





 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
-.006 -.12 0.025 .33 











.073 1.48 .11 1.41 













Table 33.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Catastrophic Potential  
 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 4.79 1.93 
   
 
anger 4.79 1.80 
   nuclear 
energy fear 4.59 2.02 
   
 
anger 3.95 1.88 1, 426 2.86 <0.05 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 3.54 1.28 
   
 
anger 3.57 1.30 
   nuclear 
energy fear 4.28 1.52 
   
 






Table 34.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 





 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
0.070 1.45 0.17* 2.23 












.11* 2.28 .27** 3.65 









* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
a. R2 change was statistically significant, F(1, 426) = 2.86, p < 0.05 





Table 35.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Dread 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 4.44 1.82 
   
 
anger 4.53 1.75 
   nuclear 
energy fear 4.95 1.30 
   
 
anger 4.68 1.71 1, 424 1.15 0.14 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 3.71 1.75 
   
 
anger 3.57 1.67 
   nuclear 
energy fear 3.62 1.67 
   
 






Table 36.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 





 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
0.02 1.33 0.08 1.07 











.054 1.07 .073 .92 















Table 37.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Test Statistics for the Interaction of 
Emotional Appeal and Message Topic on Perceived Likelihood of Fatal Consequences 
 
Nuclear Energy 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 4.03 2.01 
   
 
anger 4.04 1.82 
   nuclear 
energy fear 3.98 1.90 
   
 
anger 3.40 1.81 1, 424 2.52 <0.05 
Traffic Accidents 
     topic emotion Mean SD df F p 
traffic fear 5.47 1.31 
   
 
anger 5.50 1.19 
   nuclear 
energy fear 5.40 1.52 
   
 








Table 38.  Regression Results for the Interaction of Emotional Appeal and Message Topic 




 Model A Model B 
Independent 
Variables 
β t-statistic β t-statistic 
Emotional 
Appeal 
0.065 1.33 0.15* 2.07 













-.052 -1.03 -.11 -1.38 








* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
a. R
2














Appendix A:  Message Inductions 
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